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Abstract
We study data-driven assistants that provide
congestion forecasts to users of shared facili-
ties (roads, cafeterias, etc.), to support coordi-
nation between them, and increase efficiency
of such collective systems. Key questions are:
(1) when and how much can (accurate) predic-
tions help for coordination, and (2) which as-
sistant algorithms reach optimal predictions?
First we lay conceptual ground for this set-
ting where user preferences are a priori un-
known and predictions influence outcomes.
Addressing (1), we establish conditions under
which self-fulfilling prophecies, i.e., “perfect”
(probabilistic) predictions of what will happen,
solve the coordination problem in the game-
theoretic sense of selecting a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE). Next we prove that such
prophecies exist even in large-scale settings
where only aggregated statistics about users
are available. This entails a new (nonatomic)
BNE existence result. Addressing (2), we pro-
pose two assistant algorithms that sequentially
learn from users’ reactions, together with op-
timality/convergence guarantees. We validate
one of them in a large real-world experiment.
1 INTRODUCTION
Data-driven interventions on social and economic sys-
tems are on the rise, but it remains a challenge to under-
stand when and how they can improve such systems in
terms of peoples’ actual utilities. Here we consider cen-
tral predictive coordination assistants, that, in the sim-
plest case, work as follows: The assistant provides a
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Figure 1: Example of A ∈ R18, the assistant’s (point)
forecast, and outcome Y ∈ R18, in our cafeteria experi-
ment (A updated between but not within days, Section 6).
congestion forecast A to users of some facility, based on
past observations. The users trust A to be a good fore-
cast, and individually optimize their facility use based
on it, e.g., their arrival time slot, to coordinate and avoid
crowds. Thereby they generate an observable outcome
Y , which A is a forecast for. In particular, forecast A
influences outcome Y . Versions of such assistants exist
for roads, trains, swimming pools, etc. [Google, 2019,
ASFA, 2019, DB, 2019], or, in our experiment, a cafete-
ria, see Figure 1.
Main goals and contributions: We aim at (1) under-
standing to what extent optimally accurate assistant pre-
dictions can help coordination between users (Goal 1),
and (2) designing sequential assistant algorithms that
achieve optimal predictions (Goal 2). Our contributions:
• Introducing new concepts for this setting, we analyze
when the assistant achieving a “perfect” (probabilistic)
prediction A of Y , i.e., a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, is
equivalent to “solving” coordination in the sense of se-
lecting a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) (Theorem1).
• We establish conditions under which such a prophecy
exists even in large-scale settings with only population-
level aggregated user data (Theorem 2), using the Leray-
Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem. This entails a
new nonatomic gameBNE existence result (Corollary 3).
• We propose learning assistant Algorithms 1 and 2
(controllers), for large-/small-scale settings, with opti-
mality/convergence guarantees (Propositions 1 and 2).
• We report positive evaluation of Algorithm 1 in a
large-scale real-world cafeteria experiment (Section 6).
Overview over closest related research: Within game
theory, dynamics/equilibria of agents are studied that
learn about each other by repeatedly interacting, but
without central assistant [Shoham and Leyton-Brown,
2008]. Besides this, the following game-theoretic work
usually assumes that agents reason fully rationally based
on their own a priori given beliefs about other agents, in-
stead of using a predictive assistant informed by past be-
havioral data: Congestion games [Nisan et al., 2007] for-
malize coordination in certain shared facilities. (Alloca-
tion) mechanisms are designed [Nisan et al., 2007] that
maximize social welfare (which is defined in terms of
agent’s a priori unknown preferences), in spite of agents
being self-interested, by using incentives. Unlike our
assistant, these mechanisms often fully control the out-
come. And we consider “solving coordination” in game-
theoretic (equilibrium selection) rather than in social
welfare terms. Beyond game theory, certain smart cities
research [Marecˇek et al., 2015] uses a control-theoretic
approach for congested facilities, but they fix an objec-
tive that does not in general account for users’ individual,
a priori unknown preferences. For further related work,
see Section 7, and Section B.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND SETTING
Notation: For a vector b, bi or [b]i is the i-th compo-
nent, b−i means dropping bi, and (bi, b−i) reads b. For a
variable Z , rangeZ denotes the (implicitly given) range.
2.1 General setting and assistant-based system
Let us first introduce the general users’ decision problem.
We leave it fairly abstract so that later on we can consider
different forms of decision making scenarios based on it.
Setting 1 (General (one-stage) setting). There is a finite
set K = {0, . . . , |K| − 1} of slots1, and a set I , inter-
preted as users (here and in Section 3.2) or types of users
(in Section 3.3), respectively. Each user i ∈ I:
• receives a (private) signalWi,
• as (private) action Bi chooses a slot in K , and
• experiences (private) utility Ui he wants to maximize.
1K can be e.g., several facilities, or time slots in one facility.
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Figure 2: (Causal) diagram of the assistant-based sys-
temM (withoutU ). The dashed gray arrows indicate the
dynamic extensionM dyn we will introduce in Section 4.
Let W = (Wi)i∈I , B = (Bi)i∈I and U = (Ui)i∈I . Be-
sides the private signals, there is a publicly available sig-
nal V , and some underlying (latent) stateX . And there is
a publicly observable outcome Y = Y¯ (X,B), for some
function Y¯ .2 We assume there is a “true” distribution
P (X,V,W ). If not stated otherwise, we assume that all
users i are inference-assistable, i.e.,
Ui = U˜i(Wi, Bi, hi(Y¯ (X,B))), (1)
for (continuous) functions U˜i, hi such that
hi(Y¯ (x, (bi, b−i))) does not depend on bi, for all
b, x.3 And let all users i be assistant-separable, i.e.,
hi(Y ) ⊥ Wi|V (for any possible mechanism that
generatesB from V,W ).4
Setting 1 leaves open how users reason/decide. Our main
object of study is a system that enriches this setting: user
i choosesBi that maximizes her expected utility, given Y
is distributed according to a central assistant’s forecast:
Definition 1 (Assistant-based systemM ). Based on Set-
ting 1, or any restricted version, let the assistant-based
(one-stage) systemM be defined by the following objects
and assumptions additional to Setting 1, as depicted by
the (causal) Bayes net [Pearl, 2000] in Figure 2: There is
an assistant that takes public signal V as input and out-
putsA, a probabilistic forecast for the public outcome Y ,
2This models the fact that actions B may no be observed
publicly, but just, say, some stochastic aggregation of them.
3The intuition behind this constraint on the utility functions
is that users’ decision making can be discerned into (1) an opti-
mization performed by the users and (2) the task of predicting
Y which can be “outsourced” to an assistant.
4This means, roughly, that the users do not know more
about each other than is contained in the public V .
based on policy π, i.e., A = π(V ). That is, A is a dis-
tribution over Y (later we also consider point forecasts).
User i ∈ I takes forecast A (besides her private signal
Wi) as input, and acts assistant-best-respondingly, i.e.,
Bi ∈ argmax
b′
i
EY ′∼A(U˜i(Wi, b
′
i, hi(Y
′)) (2)
(breaking ties via K). A joint PM (X,V,W,A,B, Y, U)
is induced by all the above (measurable) equations and
P (X,V,W ). We may write PM,π and EM,π to make the
dependence on π explicit. Y is observed, but the spe-
cific P (X,V,W ) and U˜i’s are a priori unknown, and
X,W,B and utilities U are unobserved by the assistant.
2.2 Game-theoretic tools to characterize efficiency
We want to analyze the degree of efficiency that
assistant-based coordination can achieve. For this, we
now define what a “solution” of the coordination prob-
lem would be (a BNE), accounting for users’ prefer-
ences. This is based on an idealized, assistant-free ver-
sion of Setting 1 (a Bayesian game), where users i have
informed priors and unlimited inference abilities them-
selves, using Wi and V as input. Then, for any user be-
havior that arises in the assistant-based system, we can
check if it is (or rather: corresponds to) such a solution.
For background on game theory and the Bayesian game
definition we use, see Section A.
Definition 2 (Benchmark (assistant-free) game G).
Based on Setting 1, or any restriction of it, let the bench-
mark game G be defined as the Bayesian game canon-
ically associated to this setting: Each user i ∈ I is a
player who has: signal (Wi, V ) ∈ range(Wi,V ), (mea-
surable) utility function range(X,Wi,B) → R given by
Eq. 1, and actionBi ∈ K . The utility functions are com-
mon knowledge and P (X,V,W ) is the common prior.
As usual, a (pure) strategy profile for G is a tuple
s = (si)i∈I of (measurable, pure) strategies si :
range(Wi,V ) → K
5, i ∈ I . A strategy profile s is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of Glarge, if
si(wi, v) ∈ argmax
bi
EG,(bi,s−i)(Ui|wi, v), (3)
for (almost) all i, wi, v; with Ui as in Eq. 1, and
EG,(bi,s−i) the expectation under PG,(bi,s−i)(X, . . . , U)
obtained by “plugging” strategy profile (bi, s−i) into
game G (bi here means the constant strategy).
6 We call
the BNE strict if the argmax is unique.
To relate M to G, given an assistant policy π of the
assistant-based system M , we define the corresponding
5I.e., the strategy si maps player i’s signal to her action
6I.e., each player’s strategy is a best response to the others.
strategy profile sπ by the composition of π and users’
subsequent (deterministic) “best-response” action, i.e.,
[sπ]i(wi, v) := EM,π(Bi|wi, v), for all i, wi, v. (4)
Conversely, given a strategy profile s of the benchmark
gameG, we define the corresponding assistant policy7
πs(v) := PG,s(Y |v), for all v. (5)
2.3 Objective functions
We consider the following two objective functions for the
assistant’s policy π, where, as we will see, the former can
be seen as a directly measurable “proxy” to the latter:
• (probabilistic) prediction accuracy objective (loss):
Lpredπ := E (d (PM,π (Y |V ) , π (V ))) , for all π, (6)
with d(·, ·) some arbitrary but fixed statistical distance
which is 0 iff both distributions coincide;
• equilibrium selection objective8: π is optimal iff the
corresponding strategy profile sπ (Eq. 4) is a BNE of the
benchmark gameG.
We call a policy π that tries to optimize L
pred
π loosely a
(predictive coordination) assistant, and a π that achieves
L
pred
π = 0 a (formally) self-fulfilling prophecy (policy).
3 THE UTILITY OF PREDICTIONS
FOR COORDINATION – ANALYSIS
In this section, we pursue the following goal, for which
the one-stage setting we introduced in Section 2 is suffi-
cient (we will introduce a repeated version in Section 4).
Goal 1. Understand the conditions when, and the degree
to which, assistants, that achieve π ∈ argmaxπ′ L
pred
π′ ,
help solve the problem of coordination between users of
facilities (here: in terms of equilibrium selection).
3.1 Characterization step in general setting
Theorem 1 (Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Characterization).
We have, in the general setting (Setting 1, with all users
being inference-assistable and assistant-separable):
• If the assistant policy π in the assistant-based system
M (where all users are assistant-best-responding) is a
7I.e., the assistant as forecast takes the distribution of out-
come Y = Y¯ (X,B) given V = v, under G, s.
8Equilibrium selection is a game-theoretic formulation of
solving coordination [Nisan et al., 2007]. Clearly, equilibria
can still be inefficient in terms of social welfare (see Section
7).
self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e., Lpredπ = 0), then the corre-
sponding strategy profile sπ is a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium (BNE) of the benchmark game Glarge.
• Conversely, if the strategy profile s is a strict BNE of
the benchmark game Glarge, then the corresponding as-
sistant policy πs is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The proof is in Section D.1. Since in Section 2 we were
very brief regarding some of the (measurability) assump-
tions and definitions underlying the theorem, we give
a detailed elaboration of these assumptions and defini-
tions, and their soundness, in Section C. For a justifi-
cation of some of the theorem’s assumptions see Sec-
tion 7. Note that Setting 1 is formulated pretty gener-
ally: the slots K can be any set of options the users
have. K can be time slots in one shared facility, like
a road section; or K can be several facilities that pro-
vide the same service, say citizen centers in a city; or
it can be a combination, i.e., time slots in several fa-
cilities. (Our “slot” is similar to “facility”, or, to some
extent, “feasible combination of facilities”, in conges-
tion games.) The main limitation may be seen in the
assumptions of inference-assistability and assistant-best-
responding, saying that users can meaningfully evaluate
the utility of their choices based on only Y , whichA is a
forecast for.
3.2 Existence step in small-scale setting
In Theorem 1, we characterized the type of solution (a
BNE of game G) that is implemented by the assistant-
based system (with significantly lower requirements on
users’ knowledge/inference capacities than in the game
G), if the assistant reaches a self-fulfilling prophecy pol-
icy (“characterization step”). We established this result
for the general setting (Setting 1). As second step to-
wards Goal 1, it remains to understand when such a self-
fulfilling prophecy exists (“existence step”). This second
step we perform separately for two instructive subset-
tings of the general setting, which are each still reason-
ably general. As a warm-up exercise, we start in a setting
where we can easily build on game-theoretic results – be-
cause it corresponds to a classical finite Bayesian game.
3.2.1 Introducing the setting
Setting 2 (Small-scale setting). As a restricted form
of Setting 1, consider the following small-scale setting:
I = {1, . . . , n} is finite and we interpret its elements
here as users (not types), and the individual actions of the
users are directly publicly observable, i.e., Y = B, and
hi(B) = B−i in Eq. 1. X,V,W all have finite range.
Wemay writeM small andGsmall to denote assistant-based
system (Definition 1) and benchmark game (Definition
2), respectively, canonically associated to this particular
small-scale setting.
Corollary 1. Setting 2 is a special case of Setting 1. In
particular, it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and
hence the theorem’s implications hold for M = M small
andG = Gsmall.
3.2.2 Self-fulfilling prophecy existence
To understand the conditions underwhich a self-fulfilling
prophecy exists, based on the second part of Theorem 1
(or rather: Corollary 1) it is enough to understand when a
strict BNE ofG exists. But in the current small-scale set-
ting, G = Gsmall is the classical finite (Bayesian) game,
which is well understood. For example, Harsanyi [1973,
Theorems 3, 4] showed that when assuming that the play-
ers’ utilities are contaminated by a small additive noise,
then there exists a strict equilibriumwith probability one.
Furthermore, Bilancini and Boncinelli [2016] establish
conditions under which all BNE are (essentially) strict,
which entails existence of such strict BNE when com-
bined with general BNE existence results.
3.3 Existence step in large-scale setting
While the above small-scale setting is easy to under-
stand, it has significant limitations: first, the users’ ac-
tions B have to be fully observable for the (loss Lpred of
the) assistant, which is often impossible due to data pri-
vacy regulations; and second, there has to be a fixed set
of unique users, while in practice the set of users may
change of course. Therefore we perform the second step
towards Goal 1 also for the following large-scale setting
(again a subsetting of the general setting of Section 2,
different from the small-scale setting). It corresponds to
nonatomic games [Schmeidler, 1973], and is mathemat-
ically more involved, but abstracts away from individual
users and in particular only requires a cross-user aggre-
gate of actions to be publicly observed.
3.3.1 Introducing the setting
Setting 3 (Large-scale setting). As a restricted form of
Setting 1, consider the following (aggregated) large-scale
setting:
• For simplicity, we assume there are only two slots,
K = {0, 1}, and that V,W are constant.9 We assume
I = [0, 1] with the Borel sets as σ-algebra I, and inter-
pret i ∈ I as a type of user with a certain form of utility
function and private signal (similar as Kim and Yannelis
[1997]). Let rangeB (i.e., the set of possible joint user
9Wewill prove the main results, Theorem 2, for an arbitrary
number |K| of slots though. The extension to stochastic V,W
is less obvious due to measure-theoretic issues.
actions (Bi)∈I ) be the set of {0, 1}-valued Lebesgue-
measurable functions on I .
• Let rangeY1 = [0, 1] and Y1 :=
∫
Bir(i|X)di, for
(r(·|x))x∈rangeX a family of continuous (Lebesgue) den-
sities on (I, I), continuous also in x. And let Y0 :=
1 − Y1. The interpretation is that Y1 is the fraction of
users that choose slot 1, i.e., a (stochastic) aggregate of
B, and Y0 is the remaining amount of users, that choose
slot 0. Since Y = (Y0, Y1) is fully parameterized by
Y1, from now on we consider Y to be 1-dimensional and
stand for Y1.
• Regarding users i ∈ I and utilities, let hi (Eq. 1) be
the identity, and let (i, y) 7→ U˜i(k, y) be a polynomial in
i, y, for all k ∈ K (we dropped Wi, hi from the general
U˜i, Eq. 1). This means, in particular, that the utilities
only depend on the amount of users at the various slots,
not on their identities. For any k 6= l ∈ K , let U˜i(k, y)−
U˜i(l, y) =
∑
m i
mqm(y) be such that, for at least one
m ≥ 1, qm(y) is nonzero and constant in y.
Note that, while in practice of course the set of (simulta-
neous) users and thus also (simultaneous) types of users
is finite, having I = [0, 1] can be seen as an approx-
imation with nice theoretical properties to real settings
with many users. We may write M large and Glarge to
denote assistant-based system (Definition 1) and bench-
mark game (Definition 2), respectively, for this par-
ticular large-scale setting.10 Glarge can be seen as
an incomplete-information nonatomic game, related to
[Kim and Yannelis, 1997] but different in that our state
can have uncountable range, see also Section B.11 For
the sake of completeness, let us formally state a version
of Theorem 1 for this setting, proved in Section D.2.
Corollary 2. Setting 3 is a special case of Setting 1. In
particular, it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and
hence the theorem’s implications hold for M = M large
andG = Glarge.
3.3.2 Self-fulfilling prophecy existence
In contrast to the small-scale setting, for the large-scale
setting and the corresponding benchmark game Glarge
there is less established work that helps to understand
existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy policy. Intuitively,
a key question in this large-scale setting is: can a forecast
that only forecasts an aggregate of the users’ actions (the
10In the assistant-based systemM large, let rangeA be the set
of Borel measures on [0, 1], since A is a probabilistic forecast
for Y (= Y1).
11The distribution over the types (which is not to be in-
terpreted as a probability – rather as one actual realization)
is random, turning it into an incomplete-information setting.
The name “nonatomic” comes from the fact that one considers
nonatomic measures on the type space I = [0, 1].
Y of Setting 3) actually be a self-fulfilling prophecy and
thus help for coordination? For instance, as observed by
Marecˇek et al. [2016], if the population of users is com-
pletely homogeneous, they will all respond in the same
way upon receiving the same input, making coordination
difficult. Here is our answer for this question – the sec-
ond of our two main theoretical results.
Theorem 2 (Large-Scale Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Exis-
tence). There exists a self-fulfilling prophecy policy π in
the assistant-based systemM large (in Setting 3).
This implies, based on Corollary 2:
Corollary 3 (Large-Scale Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Existence). The benchmark game Glarge (for Setting 3)
has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
Proof idea and interpretation: The proof of Theorem
2, which is given in Section D.3 for an arbitrary number
of slots K , is based on the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff
fixed point theorem, harnessing the compactness of the
set of Borel measures, rangeA, under a weak topology.
The most important implication of the theorem is that
minπ L
pred
π = 0. And therefore, together with the first
step in the form of Theorem 1, it shows that an assistant
that only forecasts an aggregate can nonetheless, when
it achieves its optimum, help “solve” the coordination
problem – select a BNE. The intuition behind the as-
sumptions is that types and their utility functions have
to be diverse. Corollary 3 can be seen as stand-alone,
purely game-theoretic result for Glarge.
3.3.3 An instructive linear special case
Let us consider a simple special case of the large-scale
setting (which is not central to understand the rest of the
paper and can be skipped). On the one hand, this helps to
get an intuition for Theorem 2, on the other hand this will
justify assumptions we will make in the analysis of our
algorithm in Section 5.1. Assume the utility U˜i(k, y) of
Setting 3 is linear in i, y for all k ∈ K (making the users
“risk-neutral”). So U˜i(1, y)− U˜i(0, y) = i+ϕy+χ, for
ϕ, χ ∈ R. Let r(i|x) := 12δ [x−δ ≤ i ≤ x+δ], i ∈ I, x ∈
rangeX , with [·] the Iverson bracket (i.e., density of the
uniform on [x − δ, x + δ]), and let PX be the uniform
on [δ, 1 − δ]. Then the value of Y as a function of A =
a,X = x is, forH the Heaviside function, given by
∫
H
(∫
U˜i(1, y)− U˜i(0, y)da(y)
)
r(i|x)di (7)
=
∫
H (i+ ϕEY ′∼a(Y
′) + χ) r(i|x)di (8)
=
ϕ
2δ
EY ′∼a(Y
′) +
1
2δ
x+
δ + χ
2δ
, (9)
for x − δ ≤ −ϕEY ′∼a(Y ′) − χ ≤ x + δ, and 0 or 1,
respectively, otherwise – a piece-wise linear function in
EY ′∼a(Y
′), x.
First, this shows that under the mentioned assump-
tions, Y (and its distribution) only depends on the mean
EY ′∼a(Y
′), but no other properties of a. In particular,
L
pred
π = 0 iff L
point
π′ = 0, for π an appropriate probabilis-
tic extension of π′, and
L
point
π′ := EM,π′
(
‖A− E(Y |V )‖22
)
(10)
a point prediction version of the probabilistic predic-
tion accuracy loss L
pred
π .
12 This justifies for the assis-
tant to provide point forecasts under the above assump-
tions. Second, this justifies a (locally) linear model for
Y in (EY ′∼a(Y
′), x) and noise. Note that Theorem 2 re-
stricted to this simple linear case is immediate based on
the intuitive fact that a generic linear function has a fixed
point.
4 SETTING FOR ALGORITHM PART –
CONTROL DYNAMICS
To prepare the algorithm part of the paper, let us extend
the general one-stage setting (Setting 1) and the assistant-
based one-stage system (Definition 1) to a general dy-
namic setting and an assistant-based dynamic system
M dyn, respectively, in the following “natural” way. This
directly implies also dynamic extensions of small-scale
and large-scale setting (Settings 2 and 3) and the corre-
sponding assistant-based systems (we do not introduce
explicit symbols for them though).
The dynamic extensions consists of N copies of the one-
stage versions, called stages/repetitions. We denote vari-
ables, say A, in the t-th repetition by At, t ∈ N. Fur-
thermore, the dynamic extensions contains the follow-
ing equations that replace/extend the ones of repetition
t – think of it as a form of feedback control model, a
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
[Sutton and Barto, 1998] (from the perspective of the as-
sistant):
Xt = X¯(Xt−1, Et) (11)
At = π(V 0:t, A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1), (12)
withEt independent stochastic error terms, (measurable)
function X¯ , and (measurable) dynamic assistant policy
12The reason why we take this definition of Lpointpi instead of,
say, some form of “E((At − Y t)2|V )”, is because the (distri-
bution of) Y depends on A. And it may happen that the latter
quantity, which is some form of “variance” that depends on the
distribution of Y , is lower for a non-fixed point A than for a
fixed point A, which would hurt the relation to equilibrium se-
lection. A similar reason underlies our definition of Lpredpi .
π.13 The gray, dashed arrows of Figure 2 indicates this
dynamic extension. Regarding the assistant’s objectives,
let Lt,pred, Lt,point be defined similarly as Lpred, Lpoint, but
additionally conditioning on the observed past:
Lt,predπ =EM,π
(
d
(
PM,π
(
Y t|A0:t−1, V 0:t, Y 0:t−1
)
, At
))
,
(13)
for all π, and similarly L
t,point
π . Remember: stage t must
not be confused with (time) slot k within one stage. To
motivate the algorithmic part below, let us give two ex-
amples of naive dynamic assistant policies that fail.
Example 1 (Naive assistant yields oscillation). Con-
sider a toy scenario of two users, i = 1, 2, two slots,
K = {0, 1}, W,V,X constant, and (0, 1) and (1, 0)
the (pure) Nash equilibria of the induced complete-
information benchmark game. For simplicity, let B be
directly observed (Y = B), let A be a point forecast.
As usual, assume each day t both users best-respond
to At. The assistant starts with, say, A0 = (0, 0)
and then, naively, each day takes yesterday’s outcome
Bt−1 as forecast for today, At. It is easy to see that
this will lead to an overshooting and oscillating system
B0 = (1, 1), B1 = (0, 0), B2 = (1, 1), . . . (called flap-
ping by Marecˇek et al. [2015]).
Example 2 (“I.i.d.” assistant is sub-optimal). Classical
forecasting applied to the sequence B1, B2, ... from Ex-
ample 1 would yield the empirical distribution P (B =
b) = 12 (δ(0,0),b + δ(1,1),b), with δ the Dirac delta, as
optimal probabilistic forecast At – under some station-
arity assumption. But the actual best forecast would be a
Dirac delta on one of the two Nash equilibria (0, 1) and
(1, 0) (Theorem 1; we ignore mixed equilibria here).
5 PREDICTIVE ASSISTANT
ALGORITHMSWITH GUARANTEES
In the first part, we analyzed conditions under which pre-
dictive assistants help coordination (in terms of the equi-
librium selection objective, Section 2.3), if they manage
to optimize prediction accuracy, leaving open the “how”.
Therefore, as second part of the paper, we address:
Goal 2. Design algorithms for the assistant policy π in
the dynamic assistant-based system M dyn that optimize
prediction accuracy Lt,pred (and asymptotically select an
equilibrium, if possible), learning from past interactions.
We will consider dynamic versions of the two settings
for which we established in Section 3 that predictions
can help coordination: large-scale setting (in Section 5.1)
and small-scale setting (in Section 5.2). For each set-
ting, we propose an assistant algorithm π, and provide a
13A0:t−1 meansA0, . . . , At−1; similarly for other variables.
Algorithm 1: Expodamp (large-scale setting)
1 Input: parameter: α
2 for each stage t ≥ 1 do
3 Input: At−1, Y t−1
4 Output: At := At−1 + α(Y t−1 −At−1)
theoretical analysis of its dynamics/convergence. A uni-
fying idea behind both algorithms is that they mitigate
certain bad user behavior, e.g., “overshooting” due to too
many users jumping to the same purportedly “good” slot,
helping convergence to a Nash equilibrium (of the stage
benchmark game). Recall that users’ utilities (functions)
are hidden from the assistant (Definition 1), so the assis-
tant’s inference (about the equilibrium) is mainly based
on behavioral data of how users react to forecasts.
5.1 Expodamp for large-scale setting
Consider the dynamic large-scale setting14 (Section 4)
and let A be a point forecast for Y , i.e., rangeA =
rangeY , and consider L
t,point
π as loss (dynamic version
of Eq. 10, as described in Section 4). Recall that in Sec-
tion 3.3.3 we gave conditions that justify this point pre-
diction approach.
We propose Expodamp as described in Algorithm 1 as
the assistant’s dynamic policy π. The intuition behind
Expodamp is that this formula can dampen oscillations
due to “overshooting” user behavior (Example 1) but it
can also accommodate for non-stationarities in user pref-
erences. These intuitions will be made rigorous in the
proposition below.15
Assumption 1. Let the following equations hold for the
dynamic assistant-based systemM dyn, t ≥ 1:
Xt = Xt−1 + EtX , (14)
Y t = βAt + γXt + EtY , (15)
withEtX , E
t
Y noise terms that are independent of the past
and each other. (This is a state-space model known from
the Kalman filter [Lu¨tkepohl, 2006].)
Recall that in Section 3.3.3 we gave conditions, in the
large-scale setting, that justify the linearity in Assump-
tion 1 (note that the X in Assumption 1 would corre-
spond to a parameter of the distribution ofX rather than
14In particular, Y is considered 1-dimensional (since Y1 de-
termines Y0). The extension to more slots is straight forward.
15The formula in Algorithm 1 is a case of a so-called expo-
nential smoothing method [Hyndman et al., 2008]. However,
so far (to the best of our knowledge) it has only been applied to
classical forecasts that do not influence the outcome. In a sense,
we generalize the established method to this new setting.
toX itself in Section 3.3.3, but we neglect this detail for
simplicity of notation). Also note that Assumption 1 is
a linear approximation which facilitates the theoretical
analysis but comes at the cost of a mismatch to the actual
setting: (Y t)t∈N in Assumption 1 can leave [0, 1] in the
long run, so the model should rather be seen as a local
approximation. Note that, due to convexity, Expodamp
will always output At ∈ [0, 1] upon Y t−j ∈ [0, 1], j ≥ 1
though. Keep in mind that the fixed point (self-fulfilling
prophecy) of the linear function a 7→ βa+ γx (ignoring
the noise term) is γ(1− β)−1x (exists whenever β 6= 1).
In particular, if β = (1 − γ), then the fixed point (cor-
responding to the self-fulfilling prophecy/BNE) is x. We
can give the following guarantees, for which we prove a
generalization16in Section E.1.
Proposition 1 (Optimality and Convergence Rate of Ex-
podamp). In the dynamic large-scale setting (Section 4),
let Assumption 1 hold true. Let the assistant’s policy π
be Expodamp (Algorithm 1).
• Stochastic case: In Expodamp, let α := (1− β)−1 for
the true β of Eq. 15. Assume EtY = 0, t ≥ 1. Then, at
each stage t, Lt,point = 0 and
At=argmin
a′
E
(
‖At−Y t‖22 | A
t=a′, A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1
)
.
(16)
• Deterministic case: Assume that Xt = x is constant,
that β = (1− γ) and that EtX = E
t
Y = 0. Then
Y t = x+ (1− γ)(A0 − x)(1 − αγ)t, for all t ≥ 0.
That is, Y t converges exponentially with rate γα towards
the “optimum”/fixed point x (and thus alsoAt converges
to x based on Expodamp’s formula) if 0 < γα < 2.
When applying Algorithm 1 in practice, often one does
not know the parameter α a priori and has to infer
it. As a first approximation, it may be learned by
naively fitting Algorithm 1 to past observational data as
if it were a classical (non-influential) forecasting method
[Hyndman et al., 2008]. In principle however, without
going into detail, α rather has to be learned like a control
policy, based on how the environment responds to it.
5.2 Partpred for small-scale setting
While Expodamp is the main algorithm of this paper,
here we also provide a proof-of-concept algorithm for the
repeated small-scale setting (Section 4). Assume Xt to
be independent ofX1:t−1, i.e., the special case where the
Xt, t ∈ N are i.i.d. The algorithm, Partpred, is sketched
– for the case that V is constant – in Algorithm 2, and
fully described in Section E.2.
16It is formulated slightly cleaner, using the do-operator.
Algorithm 2: Partpred (small-scale; sketch)
1 Input: parameters: A¯, r; initialization: a ∈ A¯
2 For r steps, output A = a and sample B. Let Pˆ ra
be the resulting empirical distribution of B.
3 Let a′ := argmina′′∈A¯ ‖a
′′ − Pˆ ra‖. Let a
′′ be
obtained by only taking over a subset of best
responses from a and a′ such that a′′ is a correct
forecast at least w.r.t. some users
4 if a′′ = a then
5 Keep outputting a forever
6 else if a′′ and all other a′ ∈ A¯ have been tried r
times then
7 Set a′′ := argmina′ ‖a′ − Pˆ ra′‖
8 Keep outputting a′′ forever
9 else if a′′ has been tried r times then
10 Pick unused a′′ ∈ A¯ at random
11 Set a = a′′ and jump to line 2
The basic idea is as follows: as long as there is (sig-
nificant) uncertainty about where the optimum (self-
fulfilling prophecy/BNE) would be, the algorithm tries
to make a prediction that is at least partially correct
(i.e., makes the correct prediction at least w.r.t. the be-
havior of one player). The algorithm combines ideas
from best-response dynamics and congestion games
[Roughgarden, 2016] with random exploration whenever
the best-response dynamics would cycle. Let A¯ be the
(finite) set of all distributions PG,s(B) that arise from
(deterministic) strategy profiles s of Gsmall. For simplic-
ity, we assume A¯ to be given, but in a next step this could
be inferred as well. We give the following guarantee,
sketched for V constant, whose general version is proved
in Section E.2.
Proposition 2 (Convergence of Algorithm 2 (Sketch)).
In the setting described above, assumeGsmall has a strict
BNE. Let the assistant’s policies πr, r ∈ N be given by
Algorithm 2, with parameter A¯ as defined above. Then,
for any ε > 0, there exists R, T such that for all r >
R, t > T , it holds that P (Lt,predπr = 0) > 1 − ε and
P (sπr is a BNE of G
small) > 1− ε.
6 EXPERIMENT
Here we empirically evaluate Expodamp (Algorithm 1
for the large-scale setting) and a baseline.
Experimental setup: We conducted our experiment in a
real-world congested campus cafeteria with around 400
users per day. Here, observation [Y t]k is (a proxy to)
the number of people in the queue at time k of day t.17
17While our general considerations allow Y to be queue
length, in our large-scale setting the components of Y are the
no fore-
cast pub-
lished
web app announces
Expodamp’s forecast
to campus for 35d
web app announces
Average’s forecast
to campus for 35d
1st intervention 2nd intervention
Figure 3: Protocol of our real-world interventional ex-
periment in a large campus cafeteria; steps along Y-axis.
Method L˜t,point (MSE; Eq. 18)
Expodamp (Algorithm 1) 69.56
Average (baseline; Eq. 17) 74.25
Table 1: Evaluation shows that Expodamp has higher
prediction accuracy.
The coordination assistant in this experiment is a web
app which provides the daily forecast (i.e., the forecast is
updated once per day, in the morning – more dynamic
versions are future work) to the cafeteria users, to in-
form their decisions in terms of when to go to the cafe-
teria. The web app is used by between 15 and 45 users
per day but may influence more (slightly deviating from
our model). Besides Expodamp (with parameter α tuned
based on a previous observational sample), we evaluate
the baseline method Average defined by
at+1 :=
1
t
t∑
s=1
ys, t ≥ 2 (17)
(i.e., treating y1:t as purely observational i.i.d. sample).
Expodamp and Average are run as the policy that gener-
ates the forecast (which is then provided via the web app
to the users of the cafeteria), each for a period of T = 35
days. See Figure 3 for an illustration of the experimental
protocol. As metric, we use the mean squared error18
L˜t,point :=
1
T
T∑
t=1
‖at − yt‖22. (18)
The outcome is in Table 1, showing that Expodamp out-
performs Average in this experiment. For illustration, we
also show a sample of Expodamp’s output At and actual
outcome Y t, for one day t, in Figure 1.
slots, of which queue length is rather something like an integral.
18We use L˜t,point as a sample-level proxy for the population-
level loss Lpoint of Eq. 10. We conjecture that, under appropri-
ate assumptions related to Assumption 1, it can be shown that
the policy that is optimal under the former loss converges (say,
in probability) to a policy which is also optimal under the lat-
ter loss. The argument may build on the equivalence between
Lt,point = 0 and Eq. 16 in Proposition 1.
7 REMARKS AND FURTHER
RELATED WORK
This section discusses additional aspects of the main re-
sults and further related work.
Why prediction accuracy / equilibrium selection as
objective. Alternative to our approach in this paper, one
could start from some (somehow legitimized) social wel-
fare [Nisan et al., 2007] as a function of users’ prefer-
ences, and design assistants that try to optimize it. This
would be somewhat more in line with the economic no-
tion of optimizing efficiency. Here, we rather follow a
heuristic approach of starting with the “natural” predic-
tion accuracy objective, because it compares well to the
benchmark of equilibrium selection (Theorem 1), and for
the following reasons: First, prediction accuracy can be
directly measured, while social welfare seems hard to in-
fer/identify from the incomplete information contained
in the behavioral data available in our setting. Second, it
is easy to interpret for users and leads to a form of “in-
centive compatibility” of users’ assistant-best-response
(see remark below). Third, we feel that in our coordi-
native setting, equilibrium outcomes can be quite effi-
cient in terms of social welfare. Generally, social wel-
fare functions of course are hard to pick and impose in
the first place. Nonetheless, equilibrium outcomes can
of course be significantly inefficient, which has exten-
sively been studied under the name of price of anarchy
[Roughgarden, 2005, Nisan et al., 2007]. But even in this
regard, Theorem 1 can be helpful in that it makes predic-
tive assistant-based settings amenable to such studies.
Remarks on our model assumptions: To justify our as-
sumption of users “blindly” best-responding to the assis-
tant’s forecast (Definition 1) observe that it can be seen
as consistent with (instrumental) rationality19 in the fol-
lowing sense: if only considering the asymptotic utility
(once the assistant converged), then deviating from this
behavior means deviating from a BNE, based on Theo-
rem 1.20 Furthermore, all users best-responding simulta-
neously can sometimes be a too strong assumption, but
we feel that it is a situation that can happen (more or
less) at least sometimes, and therefore is worth analyzing.
This being said, the assistant-best-responding assump-
tion should be seen as a pragmatic first step that can be
refined in future work. Generally, Theorem 1 shows that
assistant-based systems can achieve coordination compa-
19In this work, we adopt the game-theoretic view of humans
in social situations as “selfish” agents maximizing exogenously
given individual utility functions. We feel this is appropriate for
our simple setting of facility use. But overall, decision making
in social systems has many more aspects of course.
20Nisan et al. [2011] studied rationality of best-response
dyn.
rable to the benchmark game (additionally, it serves as a
mechanism for equilibrium selection if there are several)
– but at a significantly lower cost, since the inference
task is centrally done by the assistant. (Obviously, it is
only cheaper when inference comes at a cost – otherwise
raw data V could simply be provided to users directly.)
Further general related work: Let us mention that for
the various versions of assistants we mentioned in Sec-
tion 1 that are publicly available [Google, 2019, DB,
2019, ASFA, 2019], we could not find out what al-
gorithms or theory they rely on.21 Research-wise, in
mechanism design22, a related direction has been emerg-
ing that studies how to design the information structure
[Taneva, 2015, Bergemann and Morris, 2017] instead of
the allocation/payment structure. Furthermore, data-
driven approaches to mechanism design have gainedmo-
mentum [Balcan et al., 2016, Duetting et al., 2019, Tang,
2017, Kearns et al., 2014]. But these lines of research
differ from ours – often additionally to what we already
mentioned in Section 1 (bounded rationality of our users
and limited power of our mechanism) as follows: ei-
ther they assume that agents input their (true, if “incen-
tive compatible”) preferences explicitly (instead of be-
havioral data), or they neglect, to some extent, agent’s
actual preferences (which can be appropriate for revenue
maximization of course).
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we studied when and how parts of the co-
ordination process of users of shared facilities can be
“outsourced” to a central data-driven predictive assis-
tant. Our theoretical analysis showed that such assis-
tants can help solve the coordination problem in a game-
theoretic sense, but non-trivial conditions have to be met:
in terms of the information and preference structure of
users, and stochasticity of their preferences in case only
large-scale aggregated information is available to the as-
sistant. Based on this analysis, we proposed two machine
learning coordination assistant algorithms on behavioral
data. We used linear dynamical systems models to prove
their optimality/convergence, accounting for the fact that
there is a feedback loop from predictions to outcomes.
And we conducted a large-scale interventional experi-
ment in a real campus cafeteria that provided empirical
hints for the validity of our main algorithm.
Generally, the mentioned related work and our work in-
dicate that there is a plethora of possible computational
21Also note that some of them do not explicitly call the ser-
vice an “assistant” or a “forecast”.
22The analogy between our assistant and a mechanism is that
they are both “institutions” added to the set of agents to solve
mechanisms for collective decision making, in terms
of inputs (high-level information, behavioral data, and
beyond) and influences (full control over the outcome,
money incentives, pure information/predictions, and be-
yond), many of which may still be unexplored.
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Appendix
A Background on game theory
Game theory [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008] models the interaction between
strategic23 agents, that is, settings with several such agents and where the utility of any one of them is influenced
by the actions of one or several of the others. Since each agent’s utility depends on the other agents’ actions, each
agent has to reason about how the others act when deciding on its own action.
The modeling in game theory is usually split into two parts: First, a game formalizes, in a sense, the decision making
problem, that the agents (also called “players”) are facing.24 Note that, in a sense, there are two problems, but often
they are treated simultaneously: the descriptive problem of predicting which strategies the players will chose when
facing the game, and the prescriptive problem that each player faces – choosing the strategy that best serves her
objective. Second, game theory considers solution concepts [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008] that formalize how
the agents will (in the descriptive interpretation) or should (in the prescriptive interpretation) approach this problem
(game).
Now essentially, a game, as used by game theory, represents each agent by (1) a utility function, that models her inter-
est/preferences/goals, and (2) a set of possible actions that she can take and has full control over.25 In the simplest case,
called a (complete-information) normal-form game [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008], this is essentially already the
full model. In this case it is assumed that all utility functions are fixed and each agent knows the utility function of all
other agents.
Player 2
12noon 1pm
Player 1
12noon (0, 0) (2, 1)
1pm (1, 2) (0, 0)
Table 2: Example of a two-player, two-action, complete-information coordination game. Note that our treatment in
the main paper is for the more general class of incomplete-information Bayesian games to account for the significant
uncertainty about (other) agents’ preferences that usually occurs in such settings.
Let us give an example of such a complete-information normal-form game with two players and two actions each.
We consider a simple coordination problem where the players can chose between going at 12noon or at 1pm to a
cafeteria26, and aim to avoid each others, say to avoid queuing. Additionally, assume that going early is favored by
both. Specifically, let the game be given by the payoff matrix in Table 2 (payoff matrix is just another term for “utility
matrix”). This representation has to be read as follows: player l’s utility, in case player 1 chooses action i and player 2
chooses action j, is given by the l-th entry of the tuple at column i, row j of the matrix. For instance, if player 1 goes
at 12noon and player 2 goes at 1pm, then player 1 has utility 2 and player one has utility 1.
Given such a game, each player can chose an action, and we can also consider jointly the actions of the players. We
formalize such joint actions by action profiles, i.e., tuples of actions, one for each player. For any such action profile,
we can ask if it is a solution to the game, according to some solution concept, as mentioned above. The most common
solution concept for complete-information normal-form games is the (pure) Nash equilibrium. In the two-player, two-
action case, it is defined as any action profile (i, j), such that no player can improve her utility by unilaterally deviating
to an action i′, i.e., every player chooses her optimal action (“best-responds”) given the other action in the tuple is
fixed. For instance, in Table 2, the action profile (12noon, 1pm) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
23“Strategic” means that they have goals/objectives/preferences/interests/utilities and take the best possible means to achieve
them, accounting for the (multi-agent) context; a common alternative expressions are “(instrumentally) rational”, “self-minded” or
“self-interested”.
24The name “game” likely comes from games of parlor being a special case of such games, but also based on them being a
metaphor for general multi-agent situations, a metaphor that helps for the formal abstraction.
25Alternative formulations use preference relations instead of utility functions.
26This is a toy version of the setting of our cafeteria experiment, Section 6 of the main paper.
Clearly, “complete-information” is a strong assumption and therefore a generalization of these complete-information
games has been proposed [Harsanyi, 1967], to model the case where the utility functions (more specifically: the precise
influence of the joint action on the utilities of the agents) are a priori unknown to the agents (so in a sense: the game is
a priori unknown). Intuitively, this absence of knowledge comes from agents’ preferences as well as relevant external
events not being determined/known a priori. Instead, it is assumed that each agent, before choosing its action, observes
a (private) signal and then uses a Bayesian prior distribution over this signal and the other relevant variables for its
inference, according to Bayes rule.
Let us give a formal definition, based on [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] but adapted for our purposes (Remark 1).
Definition 3. A Bayesian game consists of a set I of players, a state of the worldX , and for each player i ∈ I:
1. a signal Θi out of a set of possible signals rangeΘi ,
2. an action Bi out of a set of possible actions rangeBi ,
3. a utility function U¯ : range(X,Θi,B) → R,
and a common (“objective”) prior distribution P (X,Θi, i ∈ I).
Remark 1. We adapted the definition in [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] to our purposes in three ways: First, we
dropped the assumption of finite cardinality of the sets (somewhat similar to [Kim and Yannelis, 1997]). Second, we
formulate it more in the spirit of random variables (we event treat actions as random variables, in the sense that
choosing a specific action corresponds to intervening on the action variable, in the sense of causal models [Pearl,
2000]), instead of just specifying their ranges. Third, our “state of the world” X is a random variable and it does
not have to determine the value of the other variables. In contrast, in [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] the “state” is
the outcome, in the probability theoretic sense (as element of the sample space, typically denoted by ω ∈ Ω) [Klenke,
2013], instead of a random variable. Accordingly, in their definition, the utility function does not have to depend on
the signal, and the prior is already specified by a distribution over the state. But a Bayesian game according to our
definition can be mapped to one according to the definition in [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] in the obvious way
(essentially replacing ourX by the state in the sense of the outcome), and vice versa.
Now, while there is no single one established solution concept (mentioned above) for a Bayesian game, the most
common one is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium as we define it in Section 2 of the main paper. Note that in the case of
the Bayesian game, potential solutions are given in the form of strategy profiles (as we also introduce it in Section 2 of
the main paper), i.e., tuples (si)i∈I , where each si is a strategy – a mapping from the set rangeΘ of possible signals of
player i, to the set of possible actions rangeBi of player i. This generalizes the notion of an action profile introduced
above, accounting for the fact that the player’s behavior is only fully specified once we determine her action for each
possible observed signal.
B Additional related work and comments
Further general related work in game theory: Within game theory, note that correlated equilibria were studied
[Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] that require a correlated (i.e., central) signal. Inference of preferences from behav-
ioral data has been studied [Ling et al., 2018], but they do not feed the results back into the multi-agent system.
Interpretations of the Nash equilibrium as self-fulfilling prophecy have been discussed, often informally, in epistemic
game theory [Pacuit and Roy, 2017, Spohn, 1982]. But they do not give a rigorous analysis of the specific conditions
on information/utility/response structure for a concrete setting where the prophecy comes from an “external” agent. In-
fluential forecasts have been studied, also using fixed-point formulations but for election predictions, by Simon [1954].
Bayesian gameswith discrete actions but continuous states and signals have been studied by Hellman and Levy [2017].
Further related work within smart cities research: Besides the work already discussed in Sections 1 of the main
paper and 3.3.2 of the main paper, also the following work in the area of smart cities and control is on conges-
tion/coordination in shared facilities (often with some form of central assistant or signal): [Wirth et al., 2019] consider
agents that share a constraint resource and receive a central capacity signal. For the case that the agents behave
according to a (randomized) so-called additive-increase multiplicative decrease (AIMD) algorithm (alongside addi-
tional assumptions), their theoretical analysis shows convergence against the optimum under an overall objective
function given by the sum of the individual agents’ utilities. [Ha¨usler et al., 2014] also discuss the problem of flap-
ping for the case of coordinated (balanced) routing of cars in road networks, and present a randomized approach to it.
[Schlote et al., 2014] consider users of bike sharing stations and their decision making in terms of which station to go
to for renting/returning a bike. They present an approach that combines providing users with occupancy data and a
random assignment based on it, for the sake of balancing. The main differences between these works and ours are that
(1) we focus on game-theoretic Bayesian Nash equilibrium solutions to the coordination/congestion problem (and the
conditions under which it exists, in Theorem 2 of the main paper), and (2) our results focus more on the conditions
under which the assistant can solve certain inference/prediction tasks (like assistant-separability in Theorem 1 of the
main paper).
Further related work for Theorem 2: Our setting relates to nonatomic games [Schmeidler, 1973] studied in game
theory. However, we are only aware of two lines of work that study the incomplete-information case in the setting of
a nonatomic continuum of types: Sabourian [1990], but they do not focus on Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence
in the stage game itself. More closely related is [Kim and Yannelis, 1997]: they study existence of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in incomplete-information nonatomic games in quite general terms. But they do not cover our case where
the “state of the world” (X) has an uncountable range. Furthermore, existence of a self-fulfilling aggregate prophecy
is not entailed by their results (using our equivalence in Theorem 1), due to potential non-strictness of their Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. In this sense, our Corollary 3 may also be of value for the game-theoretic side. Let us also mention
Rath [1992], who, in one part of their proof of their Theorem 1, also reduces the Nash equilibrium existence problem to
existence of a form of self-fulfilling prophecy on the aggregate level (without considering it as such). But they restrict
to the complete-information case. From the smart cities research side, we already mentioned Marecˇek et al. [2016,
2015] above. They essentially propose two solutions: either sending different signals to different agents (which we,
in a different sense, also do in the small-scale setting, Setting 2) or the population of agents has to be heterogeneous,
which relates to our assumption of random types. But their heterogeneity is rather in the behavior, not in the form of
individually differing utility functions, as in our case.
Remarks on Algorithm 2 and Proposition 2. Algorithm 2 is mainly a proof-of-concept to illustrate several
points: An assistant can handle simultaneous/imperfectly orchestrated user responses. And while most assistant-
free dynamics of “learning in games” (mentioned in Section 1), such as best-response dynamics or ficticious play
[Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008], only converge in special cases, an assistant can help to overcome cycling and
oscillations, use exploration, and make the system always converge (with high probability; in the finite setting under
consideration). Furthermore, as the extension of Proposition 2 in Section E.2 of the main paper will make more clear,
the assistant can use prior knowledge of the utility functions, e.g. that they form a congestion game [Nisan et al.,
2007], to speed up convergence. Generally, the area of “learning in games” is related to ours in that they also consider
the case where agents do not know the preferences of others. Note that in “learning in games”, often agents first build a
model/belief about the other agents behavior and then optimize their decision under it – referred to as model-based de-
cision making [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008]. Our setting can be seen as a version of such model-based decision
making, where the data-driven modeling task is “outsourced” to the central assistant.
Additional remarks: Besides the price of anarchy [Roughgarden, 2005, Nisan et al., 2007], further limitations can
occur when extending the setting: for instance it could happen that the assistant would figure out that making users not
use the assistant (e.g., by deliberately providing poor forecasts for some time) could yield more predictable outcomes
than other strategies (although, based on our results, never as good ones as Nash equilibria) – possibly yielding
completely undesired assistant behavior. Note that, instead of making a statement about the reasonableness of Lpred
in isolation, which is impossible, rather here we analyzed the combination (Lpred, σ), for a certain joint user behavior
σ = (σi)i∈I . Also note that so far we only consider classical (Bayesian) Nash equilibria, but the results may be
extendable to harness the assistant to also announce correlated equilibria [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994].
Additional related work for algorithmic aspects: Regarding Algorithm 1 of the main paper, Zhang et al. [2013]
apply various machine learning methods to wait time prediction, similar as we do, but not considering influential
predictions or non-stationarities. Smyrnakis and Leslie [2010] model multi-agent dynamics using latent-state models,
but from the view of one of the players and in a non-aggregate setting.
C Some additional notation and details on measurability assumptions etc. in Section 2 of
the main paper
C.1 Additional notation
For the following sections, let us introduce explicit names for certain mechanisms that are part of our basic model of
Section 2 of the main paper, for which we have not given explicit names there:
• We use σi to denote user i’s behavior in the assistant-based system, i.e., i’s policy that generates her actionBi from
the input (Wi, A) in the assistant-based system, obeying Eq. 2 of the main paper, i.e., the “best response” to forecast
A (it is uniquely defined by Eq. 2 together with the tie-breaking rule we give in Section C.2). And we let σ = (σi)i∈I .
• We denote by U¯i the generic utility function, the mechanism that generates user i’s utility Ui, i.e., Ui = U¯i(X,B).
(Recall that in the main paper we generally assume inference-assistability and thus solely use the restricted form of the
mechanism in the form of the function U˜ . In particular, U¯i(X, (Bi, B−i)) = U˜i(Wi, Bi, hi(Y )) under the assumption
of inference-assistability.)
Generally, keep in mind that, for random variables Z1, Z2, P (Z1|z2) is shorthand for the (regular) conditional distri-
bution P (Z1|Z2 = z2), for z2 a value of Z2.
C.2 Details on measurability assumptions etc. and soundness of definitions in Section 2 of the main paper
We were very brief in Section 2 of the main paper regarding measurability assumptions etc. Here we explicate the
assumptions we meant there in detail.27
We will have somewhat different assumptions regarding ranges, σ-algebras, measurability etc. of variables for two
different cases: (1) finitely many users and (2) infinitely many. In the proofs, we will treat both cases simultaneously
where we can, and treat them separately where we have to.
C.2.1 Case of finitely many users
In case the set I (the set of users) is finite, we assume that (these assumptions are, in a sense, a generalization of Setting
2 of the main paper):
• there is some underlying probability space (Ω,F , P ),
• regarding ranges rangeZ of the variables Z ∈ {X,V,Wi : i ∈ I}, we assume that they are either all finite or all
continuous (meaning compact subsets of a Euclidean space),
• the ranges rangeZ of all the variables Z ∈ {X,V,Wi, Bi, Y, hi(Y ), Ui : i ∈ I} are equipped with a respective
σ-algebra denoted by σ-algZ (and Cartesian products of ranges are equipped with the respective product σ-
algebras); in particular, rangeBi , i ∈ I is K and is equipped discrete σ-algebra, and rangeUi , i ∈ I is R and is
equipped with the Borel sets, and the others are either, in the case of discrete ranges, equipped with the discrete
σ-algebras or, in the case of continuous ranges, with the Euclidean topology and the Borel sets,
• X,V,W are random variables on (Ω,F),
• the variable A as range rangeA hasM1 =M
rangeY
1 , the set of Borel measures
28 Klenke [2013] on rangeY , and
it is equipped with τA the weak topology [Klenke, 2013, Remark 13.14(ii)] and σ-algA the Borel sigma algebra
induced by the weak topology,
• the range of the public outcome variable Y is finite,
27These assumptions are more general than, but still somewhat tailored to, the two main settings we consider (small-scale and
large-scale). For our purposes this is enough. We do believe that Theorem 1 of the main paper holds more generally; but the
measurability side of things becomes rather involved.
28In the case of finitely many users, Y is assumed to be finite and then the Borel measures are just the usual simplex in the
Euclidean space. However, with the formulation in terms of Borel measures we can simultaneously cover the case of infinitely
many users, where Y is potentially continuous.
• the function Y¯ is measurable w.r.t. the respective (product) σ-algebras,
• the functions y 7→ hi(y), i ∈ I , and (i, w0, y) 7→ U˜i(w0, k, hi(y)) are continuous and bounded in all arguments
with continuous ranges29, for all k ∈ K ,
• the assistant policy π is measurable w.r.t. σ-algV and σ-algA,
• we assume that users break ties by preferring the slot k ∈ K ⊂ N with the lower number (i.e., take the natural
ordering of N as the tie breaking preference ordering whenever two slots yield the same (expected) utility Ui for
them), this together with Eq. 2 uniquely determines the user behavior σ,
• for a strategy profile s (and in particular a BNE s), we assume that s is measurable w.r.t. the product σ-algebra
σ-algW ⊗ σ-algV to σ-algA.
C.2.2 Case of infinitely many users
In case the set I is infinite (interpreted as types of users in this case), we make the following assumptions (these
assumptions are, in a sense, a generalization of Setting 3 of the main paper), as modifications of those for the case of
finite I stated above (Section C.2.1):
• we now assume V,W to be constant (corresponding to Setting 3 of the main paper), withWi also being constant
in i,
• we let I = [0, 1] (in this case interpreted as types of users), and equip with the Borel sets as σ-algebra I,
• we consider the variables A,B not to be random variables but only variables, in particular, only have a range but
not a σ-algebra,
• π takes the values of V as argument, but we do not assume measurability in this argument anymore (alternatively
one can consider π not to take any argument),
• σi, i ∈ I takes the values ofWi, A as arguments, but we do not consider it as a potentially measurable function
anymore (alternatively one can consider σi to only have argumentA),
• for the variableB, we introduce an explicit range rangeB , which is a subset of×i∈I rangeBi , and can be a proper
subset (in particular, this constraints the range of σ = (σi)i∈I ),
• the range of the public outcome variable Y can be continuous,
• we consider Y¯ to be a function with domain rangeX × rangeB , for which we do not require measurability in all
arguments but only that, for fixed b, x 7→ Y¯ (x, b) is measurable,
• for a strategy profile (and in particular a BNE) s, (which we still consider to take the values of V,W as input, but
not to be measurable in them anymore) the mapping i 7→ si is measurable w.r.t. I and 2
K .
C.3 Well-definedness in terms of measurability etc.
Above (in the case of finitely many users), we assumed measurability of all of the relevant “primitive” mappings that
occur in Section 2 of the main paper. However, for σ (defined in Section C.1 as shorthand for Eq. 2 of the main paper
and tie-breaking), the user behavior in the assistant-based system (Definition 1 of the main paper), we have to prove
measurability, because it is not a “primitive” mapping, but rather defined based on other mappings. This, together with
measurability of π, also establishes the soundness of the definition of the corresponding strategy profile (Eq. 4 of the
main paper); we will use this in the proof of Theorem 1 of the main paper.
29Again this is a formulation to cover the case of finitely and infinitely many users simultaneously.
Lemma S1. The following mappings are measurable w.r.t. the respective (product) σ-algebras (in the general setting
and the canonically associated assistant-based system): in the case of finitely many users, for fixed i,
(wi, a) 7→ σi(wi, a) (19)
and, in the case of infinitely many users, for fixed w, a,
i 7→ σi(wi, a). (20)
Proof of Lemma S1. Note that, in the case of discrete ranges, everything is measurable, so let us focus on the case of
continuous ranges.
We explicate the proof for the case of two slots, i.e.,K = {0, 1}. The case of more slots works similarly.
Measurability of the mapping in Eq. 1930:
Recall that rangeA is M1 = M
rangeY
1 , the set of Borel measures on rangeY , and we equip it with τA the weak
topology (with the bounded continuous functions as “test functions” [Klenke, 2013, Remark 13.14(ii)]) and σ-algA
the Borel sigma algebra induced by the weak topology.
LetH be the Heaviside step function. Let i be arbitrary but fixed. Let
Q(w, y) := U˜i(w, 1, hi(y))− U˜i(w, 0, hi(y)), w ∈ rangeWi , y ∈ rangeY
(here w is a value ofWi, not ofW , for ease of notation).
We have to show that (keep in mind that values a of A are elements ofM1, i.e., measures)
(w, a) 7→ σi(w, a) = H(
∫
Qi(w, y)da(y)) (21)
is measurable, as a mapping from the product σ-algebra σ-algWi ⊗ σ-algA to the discrete σ-algebra on K . For this it
is enough show that
(w, a) 7→
∫
Q(w, y)da(y) (22)
is continuous w.r.t. the respective (product) topologies, because continuity implies measurability and furthermore, the
Heaviside functionH is measurable, and so their concatenation is [Klenke, 2013].
So let (wm, am)
m→∞
−−−−→ (w, a) w.r.t. the product topology of τWi and τA, which implies convergence wm
m→∞
−−−−→ w
and am
m→∞
−−−−→ a w.r.t. the individual topologies as well. Let Rm(y) := Q(wm, y) and R(y) := Q(w, y) for all y.
Then (using an argument similar to [Brezis, 2010, Proposition 3.13])∣∣∣∣
∫
Q(wm, y)dam(y)−
∫
Q(w, y)da(y)
∣∣∣∣ (23)
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
Rmdam −
∫
Rda
∣∣∣∣ (24)
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
(Rm −R)dam
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
∫
Rdam −
∫
Rda
∣∣∣∣ . (25)
The second term converges to zero by definition of the weak convergence (becauseR is continuous and bounded, thus
qualifies as a “test function”). The first term can be bounded by∫
‖Rm −R‖∞dam ≤ ‖Rm −R‖∞
∫
1dam = ‖Rm −R‖∞
m→∞
−−−−→ 0, (26)
30We formulate this proof more generally than we would have to: we formulate it for A being a general Borel measure, although
we only consider the case of finitely many users where A is actually always a measure over a finite set.
since U˜i and thusQ is uniformly continuous (based on continuity and rangeWi and any other range to being compact)
and thus Rm converges uniformly to R. .
Measurability of the mapping in Eq. 20:
Let a, wi be arbitrary but fixed. First, observe that for all k ∈ K ,
i 7→ fk(i) := EY ′∼a
(
U˜i(wi, k, hi(Y
′))
)
(27)
is measurable since we assumed
(i, y) 7→ U˜i(wi, k, hi(y)) (28)
to be measurable (w.r.t. the product σ-algebra) and then we can apply standard arguments involved in Fubini’s theorem
(more specifically: [Klenke, 2013, Theorem 14.16, Eq. 14.6]). Now, observe that for all i
σi(wi, a) = 0 (29)
iff
0 ∈ argmax
bi
EY ′∼a
(
U˜i(wi, bi, hi(Y
′))
)
(30)
iff
EY ′∼a
(
U˜i(wi, 0, hi(Y
′))
)
−max
(
EY ′∼π(v)
(
U˜i(wi, 0, hi(Y
′))
)
,EY ′∼π(v)
(
U˜i(wi, 1, hi(Y
′))
))
= 0 (31)
But the l.h.s. of the latter equation is a composition (f0(i) − max(f0(i), f1(i))) of measurable functions (recall that
we showed i 7→ fk(i) = EY ′∼a
(
U˜i(wi, k, hi(Y
′))
)
to be measurable) that is measurable again [Klenke, 2013].
Also keep in mind the following statement, which guarantees measurability of assistant policies induced by strategy
profiles.
Lemma S2. In the case of finitely many users, given a strategy profile s, the corresponding assistant policy πs (Eq. 5)
is measurable from σ-algV to σ-algA.
Proof. We have to show that v 7→ PG,s(Y |v) is measurable, as a mapping from rangeV equipped with σ-algV , to
rangeA (generally: the set of Borel measures on Y ), equipped with σ-algA (generally: the Borel sets induced by the
weak topology on rangeA).
Let f(x,w, v) := Y¯ (x, s(v, w)).
Since we assumed rangeY to be finite in the case of finitely many users, rangeA (generally the Borel measures on
rangeY ) is simply a subspace of the Euclidean space, and σ-algA are simply the Borel sets on it. So P (Y |v) can
be seen as a finite-dimensional vector in the Euclidean space with components P (Y = yl|v) = P ((X,W, V ) ∈
f−1({yl})|v), l = 1, . . . ,m, assuming rangeY = {y
1, . . . , ym}.
So to show that v 7→ PG,s(Y |v) is measurable, it is enough to show that each of its components P ((X,W, V ) ∈
f−1({yl})|v) is measurable in v. But this holds true since given any measurable set S, we have that P ((X,W, V ) ∈
S|v) is measurable in v (by the definition of conditional expectations/distributions [Klenke, 2013]).
Also keep in mind the following observation.
Remark 2. Recall how we defined the corresponding assistant policy πs(v) in Eq. 5 as PG,s(Y |V = v). Note that,
since we assumed rangeY to be equipped with the Borel sets as σ-algebra, the (regular) conditional distribution
PG,s(Y |V = v) is a Borel measure on Y . This implies that the output of πs(v) is guaranteed to be contained in the
range rangeA we assumed for it – the Borel measures (Section C.2).
D Proofs for Section 3 of the main paper
D.1 Theorem 1 of the main paper
Before proving it, let us restate the result 31 :
Theorem 1 of the paper. We have, in the general setting (Setting 1 of the main paper, with all users being inference-
assistable and assistant-separable):
• If the assistant policy π in the assistant-based system M (where all users are assistant-best-responding) is a self-
fulfilling prophecy (i.e., Lpredπ = 0), then the corresponding strategy profile sπ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE)
of the benchmark game Gsmall.
• Conversely, if the strategy profile s is a strict BNE of the benchmark game Gsmall, then the corresponding assistant
policy πs is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Proof of Theorem 1 of the main paper. Let Zi := hi(Y ), i ∈ I .
Claim 1. If Lpredπ = 0, then sπ is a BNE of G.
Proof of Claim 1. First note that sπ can be written slightly more compactly than in Eq. 4
32, using σ as defined in
Section C.1, in the following way, for all wi, v:
[sπ]i(wi, v) := σi(wi, π(v)). (32)
Main derivation:
We state the following sequence of equalities for the case of finite I with stochastic V,W ; the case of infinite I , where
V,W are constant, is analogous but even simpler (essentially one has to drop all the occurring V,W, v, w). We have,
for all i, wi and almost all v,
[sπ]i(v, wi) (33)
= σi(wi, π(v)) (34)
∈ argmax
b′
i
EY ′∼π(v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, hi(Y
′))
)
(35)
= argmax
b′
i
EY ′∼PM,pi(Y |v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, hi(Y
′))
)
(36)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PM,pi(hi(Y )|v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(37)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PM,pi(Zi|v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(38)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PM,pi(Zi|v,wi)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(39)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PG,spi (Zi|v,wi)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(40)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PG,[spi ]−i (Zi|v,wi)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
, (41)
where:
• Eqs. 34, 35 hold by definition of sπ and the definition of the user behavior σi (Section C.1, Eq. 2 of the main paper
– assumption “assistant-best-responding”), respectively.
31Note that even when not assuming assistant-separability, a BNE may be achieved. However, this would be a BNE w.r.t. a
different game, where players would not use the full information available to them – V,Wi.
32There we used the notation based on the conditional expectation not because we refer to some averageBi, but only to rigorously
refer to the value of Bi conditioned onWi, V , which is actually fully determined by these variables.
• To understand Eq. 36, let us look at what our assumption Lpredπ = 0 implies. Based on its very definition, it implies
π(v) = PM,π(Y |v) (42)
for almost all v.
• Eq. 39 follows from our assumption (“assistant-separability”) that Zi ⊥ Wi|V for any π, σ.
• To understand Eq. 40, observe that the only thing that can be different betweenMπ (when ignoringA) andG (with
a “plugged in” strategy profile) is the mechanism that generates B from V,W . But, by our definition of sπ, this
mechanism is in fact the same inMπ and G with “plugged in” sπ. Therefore, all (random) variables, in particular Zi,
coincide betweenMπ andG with sπ.
• To understand Eq. 41 note that Zi is defined without Bi needing to be defined. Therefore, it is already defined in G
with “incomplete strategy profile” [sπ]−i alone.
• Generally, note that terms like “PM,π(Y |v)” – a regular conditional distribution – though we would not necessarily
always need them, are well-defined and exist in our setting (of discrete or Euclidean ranges) [Klenke, 2013, Theorem
8.37].
But Eqs. 33 through 41 mean that for almost no v, wi, player i ∈ I could improve his utility by deviating from
[sπ]i(v, wi).
Measurability discussion:
Generally, note that U˜i, i ∈ I is measurable also when we fix some of its arguments, because we assumed it to be
measurable w.r.t. the respective product σ-algebra [Klenke, 2013, Lemma 14.13 and Theorem 14.16].
Still for the case of I finite, note that sπ is measurable w.r.t. the product σ-algebra σ-algW ⊗ σ-algV to σ-algB (which
is necessary for it to be a strategy profile), for the following reasons: We assumed π to be measurable w.r.t. σ-algV to
σ-algA. And σ = (σi)i∈I is measurable w.r.t. σ-algW ⊗ σ-algA to σ-algB due to the first part of Lemma S1.
33 But
sπ is just the composition σ(·, π(·)).
It remains to be shown that sπ is a strategy profile, in terms of measurability (in the sense of Section C.2), also for the
case of I infinite and V,W constant. Specifically, we have to show that for any values v, w that V,W are fixed to, that
i 7→ [sπ]i(wi, v) = σi(wi, π(v)) (43)
is measurable in i (w.r.t. codomain K = {0, 1} equipped with the power set as σ-algebra). But this directly follows
from the second part of Lemma S1 (plugging in π(v) for a).
Everything together implies that sπ is a BNE of G.
Claim 2. Conversely, if s is a strict BNE of G, then Lpredπs = 0.
Proof of Claim 2. Let s = (si)i∈I be a strict BNE ofG. That is, for all i, wi, v,
si(wi, v) ∈ argmax
b′
i
E
(
U¯i(X, (bi, (sj(Wj , V ))j∈I\{i}
∣∣wi, v) , (44)
with the argmax being unique.
Similar as above, we state the following derivation for the case of finite I with stochastic V,W ; the case of infinite I ,
where V,W are constant, is analogous but even simpler (essentially one has to drop all the occurring V,W, v, w).
First, for the case of the assistant’s policy being πs, we have for all i, v, wi,
σi(wi, πs(v)) (45)
∈ argmax
b′
i
EY ′∼πs(v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, hi(Y
′))
)
(46)
33Since σ-algB is the product σ-algebra, σ measurable is equivalent to σi measurable for all i [Klenke, 2013, Corollary 1.82].
= argmax
b′
i
EY ′∼PG,s(Y |v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, hi(Y
′))
)
(47)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PG,s(hi(Y )|v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(48)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PG,s(Zi|v)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(49)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PG,s(Zi|v,wi)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(50)
= argmax
b′
i
EZ′
i
∼PG,s
−i
(Zi|v,wi)
(
U˜i(wi, b
′
i, Z
′
i)
)
(51)
= argmax
b′
i
EG,s−i
(
U˜i(Wi, b
′
i, Zi)
∣∣∣wi, v) (52)
= argmax
b′
i
EG,s−i
(
U˜i(Wi, b
′
i, hi(Y¯ (X, b
′
i, (sj(Wj , V ))j∈I\{i})))
∣∣∣wi, v) (53)
∋ si(wi, v), (54)
where:
• Eq. 46 is our assumption that users are assistant-best-responding.
• Eq. 50 follows from our assumption (“assistant-separability”) that Zi ⊥ Wi|V for any π, σ and thus also in G with
any s.
• Eq. 53 follows from how we defined Zi.
• Eq. 54 is due to s being a BNE (and our assumption that users are inference-assistable (Eq. 1 of the main paper)).
Since we assumed the above argmax to be unique, we get that for all i, wi, v,
σi(wi, πs(v)) = si(wi, v). (55)
Second, we have, for all i, v,
PM,πs(Y |v) (56)
= P
(
Y¯
(
X, (σi (Wi, πs(V )))i∈I
)
|v
)
(57)
= P
(
Y¯
(
X, (si (Wi, V ))i∈I
)
|v
)
(58)
= PG,s(Y |v) (59)
= πs(v), (60)
where:
• Eq. 58 follows from above’s derivation ending with Eq. 55.
• Eq. 60 is just the definition of πs.
This implies L
pred
πs = 0, which is what had to be shown.
Measurability discussion:
For the case of finitely many users, see Lemma S2. In the case of infinitely many, nothing has to be shown (regarding
the correctness of the codomain of πs, see Remark 2).
D.2 Corollary 2 of the main paper
Before proving it, let us restate the result form the main paper:
Corollary 2 of the paper. Setting 3 of the main paper is a special case of Setting 1 of the main paper. In particular,
it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 of the main paper and hence the theorem’s implications hold for M = M large
andG = Glarge.
Proof of Corollary 2 of the main paper. Throughout this proof, let v, w be arbitrary but fixed.
Part 1: show that general model assumptions of Section 2 of the main paper are satisfied
Regarding correctness of the range of σ(a, π(v)) (i.e., showing that it ranges within rangeB = {b ∈ N
I :
for all k ∈ K, {j ∈ I : bj = k} is measurable }):
This follows from the fact that Setting 3 of the main paper satisfies the requirements of Setting 1 of the main paper
w.r.t. the continuity of U˜i (that we stated in detail in Section C.2), which was all we needed in Lemma S1. Because
the (second part of the) lemma implies that for all w, v,
i 7→ σi(wi, π(v)) (61)
is measurable, which is what had to be shown.
Regarding the measurability of all mechanisms:
Regarding product measurability of x 7→ Y¯ (x, b)
We have to show that x 7→
∫
bir(i|x)di is measurable for fixed b.
We show the more general statement that rangeX × rangeB → rangeY = R; (x, b) 7→ f(x, b) :=
∫
bir(i|x)di
is σ-algX ⊗ σ-algB-Borel measurable, where, just for the sake of this proof, we assume rangeB to be equipped
with a σ-algebra σ-algB as will be detailed below. (This implies what needs to be shown because in our setting
measurability/contiuity in both arguments implies the same for the individual arguments when fixing the respective
other [Klenke, 2013, Lemma 14.13].)
Here, let L2 denote the Lebesgue space of square integrable functions over [0, 1] w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure (usually
denoted L2([0, 1])).
Let τX denote the topology of rangeX . Let τL2 denote the topology of L
2. Let Bτ denote the Borel σ-algebra induced
by a topology τ .
Recapture our assumptions:
• σ-algX = BτX ,
• σ-algB = BτL2 ,
• x 7→ r(·|x) =: rx is continuous from τX to τL2 .
Let τ1 be the product topology of rangeX , L
2 and τ2 be the product topology of L
2, L2.
It follows from our assumptions that the mapping
f : (x, b) 7→ (rx, b) (62)
is continuous w.r.t. source topology τ1 and target topology τ2.
But the L2 inner product 〈·, ·〉 is continuous w.r.t. source topology τ2 and target topology R. Therefore, the concate-
nation 〈·, ·〉 ◦ f is continuous from τ1 to R. Hence it is measurable w.r.t. the Borel σ-algebra Bτ1 to the Borel sets on
R.
We assumed (rangeX , τX) to be Polish. And L
2, the space of B, is Polish. Therefore (based on [Klenke,
2013][Theorem 14.8]), Bτ1 , the Borel σ-algebra induced by the product topology on rangeX , L
2, coincides with
the product σ-algebra σ-algX ⊗ σ-algB .
Regarding correctness of rangeA (i.e., that it contains the distribution over Y that is entailed by it): We have to
show that P (Y |A = a) ∈ rangeA for any a ∈ rangeA. To see this, note that we above showed that x 7→ Y¯ (x, b) is
measurable with σ-algY being the Borel σ-algebra on rangeY . Therefore the pushforward measure P (Y |A = a) =
P (g(X)|A = a), for g(x) = Y¯ (x, b), is a Borel measure, i.e., element of rangeA.
Part 2: show that the remaining conditions of the underlying theorem are satisfied
Regarding assumption inference-assistability: Let hi simply be the identity. Then, based on Setting 3 of the main
paper, we have
U˜i(fWi(x), bi, Y¯ (x, b)) = U˜i(fWi(x), bi, hi(Y¯ (x, b))) (63)
and hi(Y¯ (x, b)) does not depend on bi since
Y = RX({j ∈ I : Bj = k}) = RX({j ∈ I : Bj = k, j 6= i})
based on the fact thatRx – which is the measure induced by the density rx – has a density w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.
Regarding assumption of assistant-separability:
Since we assumed thatWi is constant for all i ∈ I , it follows trivially that Zi ⊥ Wi|V .
D.3 Theorem 2 of the main paper
The following statement generalizes Theorem 2 of the main paper in that here we allow an arbitrary finite number |K|
of (time) slots, not just two (i.e., arbitrary finiteK , not justK = {0, 1}).
Theorem 3. There exists a self-fulfilling prophecy policy π in the assistant-based system M large, in Setting 3 of the
main paper but with an arbitrary finite number |K| of slots.
Here is the proof of this generalized version:
Proof for Theorem 2 of the main paper. Keep in mind that in the current large-scale setting, i ∈ I are interpreted as
types of users (with the same utility function), not users themselves. Also keep in mind that the set of slots (i.e., actions
available to the users) is K = {1, . . . , |K|}. SinceW is constant, here, instead of U˜i(w, b, k), we will write U˜i(y, k)
for utility of type i when choosing slot k ∈ K given amounts of types y ∈ R|K| at slots 1 to |K|.
In what follows, we will consider the spaceM1 of Borel probability measures on the standard |K| − 1 simplex
S|K| =

z ∈ R|K|
∣∣∣∣∣∣z ≥ 0,
|K|∑
k=1
zk = 1

 .
Furthermore, let, for any k, l,Hkl be the common Heaviside step function (i.e., taking value 0 upon input below 0, and
value 1 upon input above 0), defining it in a special way for the point 0 (to implement a tie breaking rule that favors
lower slots k ∈ K):
Hkl (0) :=
{
1, if k ≤ l,
0, if k > l.
First we note that for any measure µ ∈ M1 the expected proportion of users choosing slot k conditioned on X = x
with assistant prediction A = µ is
F kµ (x) :=
∫ ∏
l 6=k
Hkl
(∫
Qkl (i, y)dµ(y)
) r(i|x)di ,
with Qkl (i, y) = U˜i(y, k)− U˜i(y, l). Given our measurability assumptions,
Fµ := (F
1
µ , . . . , F
|K|
µ )
is well defined and measurable, such that the pushforward measure ofX by it is also a Borel probability measure.
Let µ, µ1, µ2, . . . ∈M1, we say that (µn)n∈N converges weakly to µ if for any f continuous on S|K|∫
fdµn −→
n→+∞
∫
f(y)dµ .
Weak convergence induces the weak topology τ on M1, and M1 is compact for this topology (see for example
[Klenke, 2013, Section 13.2]). As a consequence M1 is a non-empty compact convex set of the locally convex
topological vector space of bounded signed measures on S|K|.
In order to prove the existence of a fixed point in M1, according to Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem
[Reed and Simon, 1972, p151], what remains is to prove that the mapping
J :
{
M1 → M1
µ 7→ P (Fµ(X))
is continuous for the above defined weak topology.
Consider µn → µ (for this weak topology). We have to show that for any f continuous on S|K|∫
fdJ(µn)→
∫
fdJ(µ).
We rewrite the left-hand side (using basic change of variable in the Lebesgue integral), assuming PX has a bounded
density pX with respect to Lebesgue measure:
∫
fdJ(µn) = E [f(Fµn(X))] =
∫
f(Fµn(x))pX(x)dx.
Since f is also uniformly continuous on this (compact) simplex, proving uniform convergence on S|K| of Fµn to Fµ
will be enough to conclude. Let us fix an ǫ, we want to bound ‖Fµn − Fµ‖ by ǫ uniformly over S|K|. Since S|K| is
included in a finite dimensional Euclidean space, a uniform bound on each component will be enough to conclude.
We first note that for any component k
|F kµn(x) − F
k
µ (x)| ≤
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣
∏
l
Hkl
(∫
Qkl (i, y)dµn(y)
)
−
∏
l
Hkl
(∫
Qkl (i, y)dµ(y)
)∣∣∣∣∣ r(i|x)di (64)
We notice we can rewrite the difference of Heaviside products as
∑
m
∏
l<m
Hkl
(∫
Qkl (i, y)dµ(y)
)
·
(
Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµn(y)
)
−Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµ(y)
))
·
∏
l>m
Hkl
(∫
Qkl (i, y)dµn(y)
)
(65)
such that we can bound the absolute difference of Eq. (64) using (based on the terms of the product that are not
differences being at most 1 anyway)
|F kµn(x) − F
k
µ (x)| ≤
∑
m
∫ ∣∣∣∣Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµn(y)
)
−Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµ(y)
)∣∣∣∣ r(i|x)di . (66)
We will thus focus first on bounding an arbitrary term∫ ∣∣∣∣Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµn(y)
)
−Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµ(y)
)∣∣∣∣ r(i|x)di , (67)
dropping the indicesm and k
Our assumptions (Setting 3 of the main paper) imply any Qkm is a polynomial in (i, y), that can be written∑d
m=0 i
mqm(y). Then integrating the quantity inside each H yields polynomials in i, p(i) and pn(i), of maximum
order d, whose coefficients are a linear combination of the moments of µ and µn respectively, up to some order d
′.
Convergence of µn to µ thus guarantees convergence of the coefficients of pn to those of p, and uniform convergence
of the pn to p on the unit interval.
The discontinuity ofH does not allow us to further use uniform continuity to bound the term of Eq. (67), but we notice
that the absolute difference between the two H terms is either zero or one, the later occurring only when the signs of
pn an p differ. Using the assumption that there exists at least onem such that qm(y) is constant and non-zero implies
p is a non-zero polynomial. There is then only two possible cases to consider:
• If p has no root on the unit interval (e.g. p is constant), then uniform convergence guaranties we can choose N
large enough such that p and pn have the same sign on the unit interval, implying the difference in Heaviside
function is zero on the whole interval and the corresponding term of Eq. (67) can be ignored.
• Alternatively, p has a finite number of roots, and for n large enough the difference inside the integral in Eq. (67)
can be non-zero only on a finite number of intervals surrounding these roots, where the sign of the p and pn may
differ. We will thus focus on this case and show the length of these intervals can be bounded.
Let (il) be all the (finite) collection of roots of p on the unit interval, then there exists a η0 thus that p is strictly
monotonous in all right and left η0-neighborhoods of each il (one-sided neighborhoods are needed for roots with even
multiplicity), and thus admits a family of one-sided monotonous continuous local inverse functions
(
κ+l , κ
−
l
)
, up to a
change in sign, such that for each l,
κ+l (|p(i)|) = i− il, i − il ∈ [0, η0]
and
κ−l (|p(i)|) = i− il, i− il ∈ [−η0, 0]
(note continuity of the inverse is guaranteed by continuity and strict monotonicity, while the implicit function theorem
does not directly apply at multiple roots due to vanishing of the derivative). Let ǫ′0 be the maximum radius such that
the interval [0, ǫ′0] is included in the intersection of the domains of all κ
−
l and κ
+
l . We additionally choose ǫ0 ≤ ǫ
′
0
such that |p(i)| > ǫ0 for any i outside the union of intervals [il + κ
−
l (ǫ0), il + κ
+
l (ǫ0)] associated to each root l (this
can be done by picking the minimum between ǫ′0 and the lower bound of |p| outside of the neighborhoods of each
root). Let us choose N0 such that for n > N0, |p − pn| < ǫ0 uniformly on the unit interval. Then the Lebesgue
measure (λ(Inǫ0)) of I
n
ǫ0
, the union of all intervals such that∣∣∣∣Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµn(y)
)
−Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµ(y)
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣Hkm (pn(i))−Hkm (p(i))∣∣ > 0 (= 1) ,
is inferior to
∑
l
∣∣κ+l (ǫ0)− κ−l (−ǫ0)∣∣. This is because outside of Inǫ0 , p is at least as far away from 0 as ǫ0, so pn
has he same sign as p. By (uniform) continuity of all κ+l and κ
−
l , for η1 arbitrary small, we can choose ǫ1 < ǫ0 and
N1 > N0 such that for n > N1, λ(I
n
ǫ1
) < η1, such that, since r(i|x) is continuous (and thus bounded) on [0, 1]2, we
get ∫ ∣∣∣∣Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµn(y)
)
−Hkm
(∫
Qkm(i, y)dµ(y)
)∣∣∣∣ r(i|x)di ≤ η1max(r) . (68)
As this procedure can be done for allm 6= k, , we can bound the k-th component of Fµ using
|F kµn(x) − F
k
µ (x)| ≤ (|K| − 1)η1max(r) ,
for η1 arbitrary small. We thus get a uniform bound for ‖Fµn(x) − Fµ(x)‖, which is enough to ensure that J is
continuous for the weak topology.
This implies the existence of a fixed point of J inM1 according to the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem
[Reed and Simon, 1972, p151].
E Proofs and extensions for Section 5 of the main paper
E.1 Extended version of the proposition and proof for Section 5.1 of the main paper
Let us state and proof a proposition that is a slight generalization of Proposition 1 of the main paper.
Proposition S1 (Optimality and Convergence Rate of Expodamp – Generalized Version of Proposition 1 of the main
paper). In the dynamic large-scale setting (Section 4 of the main paper), let Assumption 1 of the main paper hold true.
• Stochastic case: Let the assistant’s policy π be defined by
A0π := γ(1− β)
−1
E(X0), (69)
At+1π := A
t
π + γ(1− β)
−1Qt(Y
t −Atπ), (70)
for all t ≥ 0 with Qt some function of the covariance structure as detailed in Eq. 77 of the proof of this proposition.
In particular, Qt is such that, if there is no observation noise in the latent-state model, i.e., var(E
t
Y ) = 0, then π
coincides with Expodamp (Algorithm 1 of the main paper) when setting α := (1− β)−1 for the true β of Eq. 15 of the
main paper.
Assume E(EtY ) = 0, t ≥ 1. Then
34, at each stage t, Lt,point = 0 and
At=argmin
a′
E((At−Y t)2|do(At=a′), A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1). (71)
• Deterministic case: Let the assistant’s policy π be Expodamp (Algorithm 1 of the main paper). Assume thatXt = x
is constant for t ≥ 0, that β = (1− γ) and that EtX = E
t
Y = 0. Then
Y t = x+ (1 − γ)(A0 − x)(1 − αγ)t, for all t ≥ 0.
That is, Y t converges exponentially with rate γα towards the “optimum”/fixed point x (and thus also At converges to
x based on Expodamp’s formula) iff 0 < γα < 2.
Proof of Proposition S1. First part of the proposition – stochastic case:
Prerequisites:
Consider the complete dynamical system, consisting of Assumption 1 of the main paper, the state-spacemodel (without
assistant’s behavior), together with Eq. 12 of the main paper, the assistant’s behavior under policy π. For this model
let, for Z ∈ {Y,X} and t ≥ t′,
Zt|t
′
:= Eπ(Z
t|Y 0:t
′
, A0:t
′
) (72)
Σ
t|t′
Z := varπ(Z
t|Y 0:t
′
, A0:t
′
). (73)
To be as explicit as possible, note that, for Z ∈ {Y,X} and t ≥ t′ (due to the causal structure)
Eπ(Z
t|Y 0:t
′
, A0:t
′
= a0:t
′
)
(
= Eπ(Z
t|Y 0:t
′
, do(A0:t
′
= a0:t
′
))
)
= E(Zt|Y 0:t
′
, a0:t
′
),
where the latter expectation is taken in the POMDP model of Assumption 1 of the main paper when setting At to
constants at, for t ≥ 0, and not plugging in any assistant policy. The analogous holds for varπ(Zt|Y 0:t
′
, A0:t
′
).
So we can use the classical Kalman filter recursive equations [Lu¨tkepohl, 2006, Section 18.3.1], which hold for the
POMDP model, and thus, based on Eq. 74, also for Zt|t
′
,Σ
t|t′
Z , for Z ∈ {Y,X} and t ≥ t
′ defined in the complete
34One can also make the more general statements about pi minimizing the cumulative (over time) loss. To see that the “local”
statement (for individual t) implies more global statements observe two things: First,At influences only Y t but no future Y t
′
, t′ >
t, and so term-wise optimization coincides with cumulative optimization. Second, pi as defined above does the optimal thing at
stage t regardless of how At
′
, t′ < t was picked, in case we feed what pi would have outputted at stage t − 1, instead of the actual
At−1, into pi at stage t.
dynamical system including assistant policy. Specifically, the relevant equations are as follows:
Xˆt+1|t = Xˆt|t (74)
= Xˆt|t−1 +Qt(Y
t − Yˆ t|t−1) (75)
= Xˆt|t−1 +Qt(Y
t − γXˆt|t−1 − βAt), (76)
for
Qt := γΣ
t|t−1
X (Σ
t|t−1
Y )
−1 (77)
= γΣ
t|t−1
X (γ
2Σ
t|t−1
X + var(E
0
Y ))
−1. (78)
Note that Qt does not depend on the A
t, t ∈ N, when consideringAt, t ∈ N as a parameter.
Showing Eq. 71:
Assume the conditions of the proposition, i.e., that the assistant’s policy π is defined by Eq. 69 and 70 (for convenience
we may drop the subscript π of Atπ in what follows), with Qt from Eq. 77. and Assumption 1 of the main paper.
Let us show via induction that
At = γ(1− β)−1Xˆt|t−1, for all t ≥ 0, (79)
where we let Xˆ0|1 := E(X0).
Base case: For t = 0, the statement holds by definition.
Induction step: Assume the statement holds for t. Then we have
At+1 = At + γ(1− β)−1Qt
(
Y t −At
)
(80)
= γ(1− β)−1
(
γ−1(1 − β)At +Qt(Y
t −At)
)
(81)
= γ(1− β)−1
(
γ−1(1 − β)At +Qt(Y
t − γγ−1(1− β)At − βAt)
)
(82)
= γ(1− β)−1
(
Xˆt|t−1 +Qt(Y
t − γXˆt|t−1 − βAt)
)
(83)
= γ(1− β)−1Xˆt+1|t, (84)
where Eq. 83 is due to the inductive assumption, and Eq. 84 is based on Eq. 76. This completes the induction for
Eq. 79.
Now observe that the statement we need to show, Eq. 71, is equivalent to
0 =
d
da
E((At − Y t)2|do(At = a), A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (85)
=
d
da
E((At − βAt − γXt − EtY )
2|do(At = a), A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (86)
=
d
da
E(((1 − β)At − γXt − EtY )
2|do(At = a), A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (87)
=
d
da
E(((1 − β)a− γXt − EtY )
2|A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (88)
= E(
d
da
((1− β)a− γXt − EtY )
2|A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (89)
= E(2((1 − β)a− γXt − EtY )(1 − β)|A
0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (90)
= 2(1− β)E((1 − β)a− γXt − EtY |A
0:t−1, Y 0:t−1), (91)
which in turn is equivalent to
a = (1− β)−1
(
E(γXt|A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) + E(EtY )
)
(92)
which in turn is equivalent to (based on our assumption E(EtY ) = 0, t ≥ 1)
a = γ(1− β)−1E(Xt+1|A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1), (93)
which in turn is equivalent to (simply plugging in the definition in Eq. 72)
a = γ(1− β)−1Xˆt|t−1. (94)
Since we know, based on Eq. 79, that At under π satisfies Eq. 94 when plugging it in for a, based on the chain of
equivalences above, we also know that it satisfies Eq. 71, which is what needed to be shown.
The statement that Expodamp (Algorithm 1 of the main paper) is a special case of the assistant policy defined in Eq. 69
and 70 can easily be seen as follows: If there is no observation noise in the latent-state model, i.e., var(EtY ) = 0, then
Eq. 78 implies that Qt = γ
−1. Hence, when setting α = (1− β)−1, we have
At+1 = At + (1− β)−1
(
Y t −At
)
= At + α
(
Y t −At
)
, (95)
i.e., we get Expodamp (Algorithm 1 of the main paper) as special case.
Showing that Lt,pointπ = 0:
To also show the first statement, L
t,point
π = 0, observe that this means
0 = E
(
(At − E(Y t|At, A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1))2
)
(96)
which is equivalent to
At = E(Y t|At, A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1) (97)
almost everywhere. This in turn is equivalent to
a = E(Y t|At = a,A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1)
for all a, which is equivalent to
0 = a− E(Y t|At = a,A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1)
= E(a− Y t|At = a,A0:t−1, Y 0:t−1)
= E(a− βa− γXt − EtY |A
0:t−1, Y 0:t−1)
= E((1 − β)a− γXt − EtY |A
0:t−1, Y 0:t−1).
This is equivalent to Eq. 91, which was equivalent to Eq. 94, which, as stated above, is satisfied by π.
Second part of the proposition – deterministic case:
In this proof (and only here) let us, for simplicity, use the following notation:
• Y t, t ∈ N denotes a sample path (instead of a random process),
• and Y denotes (Y t)t∈N.
Let Y˜ denote the one-sided Z-transform of Y Proakis and Manolakis [1996], defined as the Laurent series (considered
formally without considerations on the domain of convergence)
Y˜ (z) =
+∞∑
k=0
Y kz−k, z ∈ C,
and similarly forX,A. The assumed dynamics equation expressed in the Z-domain leads to
Y˜ (z) = (1− γ)A˜(z) + γX˜(z) .
The equation that defines Expodamp implies (using the time-shifting formula [Proakis and Manolakis, 1996, p. 208])
z
(
A˜(z)−A0
)
= (1− α)A˜ + αY˜ .
Combining the above equations results in the following expression for Y in the Z-domain:
Y˜ (z) =
(γ − 1)x
1− z−1(1 − αγ)
+
x
1− z−1
+
(1 − γ)A0
1− z−1(1− αγ)
.
By classical inversion formulas of the Z-transform, we finally get
Y t = x+ (1− γ)
[
A0 − x
]
(1− αγ)t , t ≥ 0 .
which shows the exponential convergence for any (A0, x) under the condition 0 < γα < 2
E.2 Full algorithms, proposition and proof for Section 5.2 of the main paper
In this section, let us give the “equilibrium selection objective” (Section 2 of the main paper) a formal loss function:
Lt,Nashπ :=
{
0, if sπ is a BNE of G (w.r.t. the variables of the t-th stage)
1, else.
(98)
Furthermore, let NE stand for (complete-information) Nash equilibrium.
E.2.1 Detailed algorithms
Consider Algorithm S3 together with Algorithms S4 and S5, respectively, as subroutines. It is a rigorous version of
Algorithm 2 of the main paper that is also more general in that it allows V to vary.
E.3 Generalized proposition and proof
Let us state a proposition that generalizes Proposition 2 of the main paper.
Proposition 3 (Convergence of Algorithm S3; sketch). In the dynamic small-scale setting (Section 4), assume Xt to
be independent ofX1:t−1, and that in Gsmall exists a strict BNE. Then the following holds true:
• General stochastic case: Let, for all v,
A¯v := {PG,s(B|v) : s is a (deterministic) strategy profile of the benchmark gameG
small}. (99)
(Note that A¯v is finite since the range of all variables W,B is finite.) Let A¯ := (A¯v)v∈rangeV . Let the assistant’s
policy πr be Partpred(A¯, r,UpdateFunctionGeneral) as defined in Algorithm S3 with UpdateFunctionGeneral as
defined in Algorithm S5, and A¯ as defined above.
Then, for any ε > 0, there exists R, T such that for all r > R, t > T , it holds that P (Lt,predπr = 0) > 1 − ε and
P (Lt,Nashπr = 0) > 1− ε.
• Directed convergence in in complete-information congestion game case: (Note that a version of this part of the
proposition can be formulated where not best, but just improving responses are assumed for the customers, which
can even speed up convergence in certain cases.) Let W be fully determined by V and for each value of V , let the
(complete information) game Gsmall be a congestion game [Roughgarden, 2016] where all Nash equilibria are strict.
For simplicity, in this deterministic setting, assume A ∈ rangeB (i.e., an action profile instead of (Dirac) distributions
over action profiles). Let the assistant’s policy πr be given by Partpred(A¯, r,UpdateFunctionCongestion) (Algo-
rithm S3) withUpdateFunctionCongestion as defined in Algorithm S4, and A¯ = rangeB the set of all action profiles.
Then Lt,predπr , L
t,Nash
πr
→ 0 for t→∞ without ever invoking line 14, i.e., without needing “undirected” search.
Algorithm S3: Partpred
Input: parameters: A¯ = (A¯v)v∈rangeV , r, UpdateFunction
1 For each v ∈ rangeV , initialize av ∈ A¯v randomly
2 for each stage t ≥ 0 do
Input: v := V t
3 if av has been announced less than r times or has converged under V = v then
Output: At := av
4 else
5 Let Pˆ rv,av be the empirical distribution of B in the r times it was sampled under V = v,A = av
6 Let a′v := argmina′′v∈A¯v ‖a
′′
v − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖
7 Let a′′v := UpdateFunction(av, a
′
v, v)
8 if a′′v = av then
9 Remember that for V = v, convergence happened
10 else if a′′v and all other av ∈ A¯v have been tried r times then
11 Set a′′v := argmina′v ‖a
′
v − Pˆ
r
v,a′v
‖
12 Remember that for V = v, convergence happened
13 else if a′′v has been tried r times then
14 Pick unused a′′v ∈ A¯v at random
15 Set av = a
′′
v
Output: At := av
Algorithm S4: UpdateFunctionCongestion
// For simplicity, consider av, a
′
v as action profiles in rangeB instead of
(Dirac) distributions over action profiles
Input: av, a
′
v, v
1 Let a′′v := av and J := ∅
2 while There is i ∈ I s.t. [av]i 6= [av]j and [a′v]i 6= [a
′
v]j for all j ∈ J do
3 J := J ∪ {i}
4 [a′′v ]i := [a
′
v]i
Output: a′′v
Algorithm S5: UpdateFunctionGeneral
// For simplicity, in what follows, let [av]i denote the marginal
distribution of Bi under av
Input: av, a
′
v, v
1 Let a′′v := av
2 if There exists an i ∈ I s.t. [av]i 6= [a′v]i then
3 pick one such i at random, if there are several
4 [a′′v ]i := [a
′
v]i
Output: a′′v
Proof for Proposition 3. First part of the proposition: General stochastic case:
Prerequisites.
Let Pv,av := PM (B|V = v,A = av). Keep in mind that, as usual, by a fixed point/self-fulfilling prophecy under
V = v we mean av with Pv,av = av. By assumption, there exists a strict BNE in G
small. Then Corollary 1 of the main
paper implies that there is π with 0 = Lpredπ = E(d(PM (B|V,A = π(V )), π(V ))). Hence, for each V = v there exists
a fixed point.
Now let v be arbitrary but fixed. Keep in mind that by a (same-covariate, same-prediction) group (of stages) we mean
the subsequence of R stages (tvj )j where V
t = v and At = av for some av ∈ A¯v. Furthermore, let us say the
algorithm converges at that and that group of stages with covariate v, if after that group of stages it will always output
the same av. Let J := |A¯v|. Let d := minav,a′v∈A¯v ‖Pv,av − Pv,a′v‖.
Observe that the algorithm certainly converges in finite time – at the latest after sampling has happened r times
(corresponding to one group) under all av ∈ A¯v , i.e., after Jr stages. So we have to show that with growing R the
probability that the reason for convergence is not that it found an actual fixed point (self-fulfilling prophecy) goes to
zero. Observe that in order for it to not converge due to finding an actual fixed point either of the following two events
has to happen:
• the algorithm converges at some action that is not a fixed point by wrongly taking it for a fixed point;
• it converges after the J groups of stages by the criterion to force convergence after J (lines 10 to 12), and has missed
the actual fixed point (or one of the actual fixed points).
So it suffices to show for these events individually, that with growing R the probability that they happen goes to zero.
Bound the probability that the algorithm converges at some action that is not a fixed point by wrongly taking it
for a fixed point.
Observe that during the phase where the algorithm has not converged yet, each av ∈ A¯v is chosen as action A during
at most one group of stages and let us denote the corresponding empirical distribution of B by Pˆv,av .
The phase where the algorithm has not converged yet consists of at most J groups of stages, and at most J − 1 groups
of stages where A is an av that is not a fixed point. Given any ε, we have to show that there is R, such that for any
r > R, we can bound the probability that the algorithm converges due to “wrongly taking av as a fixed point” at the
end any of these groups of stages by ε. We do so by bounding the probability that this happens at any individual group
of the at most J − 1 groups where av is not a fixed point, and then sum them up and apply the union bound.
Let R ∈ N be such that, for all r > R and for all av ∈ A¯v that are used during these most J − 1 groups where av is
not a fixed point: P (‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ > d2 ) <
ε
J−1 , with Pˆ
r
v,av
for the respective used av as defined in Algorithm S3.
(Such R exists based on the weak law of large numbers Klenke [2013] and the fact that A¯v is finite.)
So let us fix one of these groups of stages where A is an aw that is not a fixed point. In particular, av 6= Pv,av . (Keep
in mind that nonetheless, Pv,av ∈ A¯v.) For all r > R, the probability that the algorithm converges at the end of this
group of stages coincides with (or rather: is bounded by) the probability that ‖av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ ≤ ‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖. But
P
(
‖av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ ≤ ‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖
)
≤ P (‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ >
d
2
) <
ε
J − 1
.
To see why the inequality holds true, observe that the event ‖Pv,av−Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ ≤ d2 implies the event ‖av−Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ ≥ d2 ≥
‖Pv,av−Pˆ
r
v,av
‖. (To see the first inequality, assume otherwise. Then ‖Pv,av−av‖ ≤ ‖Pv,av−Pˆ
r
v,av
‖+‖av−Pˆ rv,av‖ <
d, which contradicts what we assumed.)
So the probability that the algorithm converges at the end of any of these groups of stages (whereA is an av that is not
a fixed point) is bounded by (J − 1) ε
J−1 = ε. This is what had to be shown.
Bound the probability of convergence of the algorithm after the J groups of stages by the criterion to force
convergence after J , and having missed the actual fixed point (or one of the actual fixed points).
What we have to do here is bound the probability that a fixed point is not taken as a fixed point. Let us be more specific.
Given any trajectory of the algorithm with some ordering of the groups of stages, let av ∈ A¯v be a (the first one, if
there are several) fixed point, i.e., av = Pv,av , which is taken as A at some point during the trajectory. Given any ε,
we have to show that there is R, such that for any r > R, we can bound the probability that av is “not recognized as a
fixed point” by ε.
Let R ∈ N be such that P (‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ > d2 ) < ε for all r > R and for all av ∈ A¯v . (Such R exists based on the
weak law of large numbers Klenke [2013] and the fact that A¯v is finite.) Then for all r > R, the probability that it is
not recognized as a fixed point is
P
(
‖a′v − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ < ‖av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ for some a′v
)
= P
(
‖a′v − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ < ‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ for some a′v
)
≤ P (‖Pv,av − Pˆ
r
v,av
‖ >
d
2
) < ε.
(Since d is the minimum distance between a′v and Pv,av – the analogous argument as before.)
Finally.
Now simply take R, T large enough such that:
• With high probability, each V = v (with positive probability) has been observed at least JR times.
• Within the event that each V = v (with positive probability) has been observed at least JR times: for r > R, under
algorithm πr, the probability that converges against a fixed point occurred under all V = v (which is a product of
| rangeV | probabilities that each go to 1 with growing r, based on the above) is high enough.
Second part of the proposition: Directed convergence in complete-information congestion game case:
We write down the proof for the case of a fixed V . The general case works analogously.
Let Φ denote the potential function (the bigger the utilities, the bigger the potential function) [Roughgarden, 2016] of
the congestion game (and thus potential game)Gsmall.
Let stage t, announcementAt = a and outcomeBt = b be arbitrary but fixed. In what follows, we say a set E ⊂ I of
players is collision-free if (1) bi 6= bj for any i, j ∈ E (no two players in E move to the same “target” slot), and (2)
ai 6= aj for any i, j ∈ E (no two players in E move from the same “source” slot). Let us denote
aE := (bi : bi = bi if i ∈ E, else bi = ai, i ∈ I) ∈ B,
i.e., applying all moves of players in E to a.
Claim: If E ⊂ F ⊂ I are collision-free, then Φ(aF )≥Φ(aE). So, roughly speaking, setting At+1 := aE for any
collision-freeE, such that no superset F ⊇ E is collision-free, is a reasonable policy for the assistant.
To see why this holds, let b1 = a, b2, . . . , bk = aE be a path from a to aE , meaning that at each step j from bj to bj+1,
only one player ij ∈ E applies her move [b− a]ij to b
j .
For the potential function Φ [Roughgarden, 2016] we have
Φ(bk)− Φ(b1) (100)
=
∑
j
Φ(bj+1)− Φ(bj) (101)
=
∑
j
uij (b
j+1)− uij (b
j). (102)
Hence, it suffices to show that uij (b
j+1) − uij (b
j) ≥ 0 for all j, because then we cannot do better than aE by taking
aF for any subset F ⊂ E. To prove this, we establish that for all j,
uij (b
j+1)− uij (b
j) ≥ uij (b
j+1
ij
, b1−ij )− uij (b
1) ≥ 0. (103)
The second inequality directly follows from our assumption that player ij makes an improvement move. To prove the
first inequality, we show that for all j,
uij (b
j+1) ≥ uij (b
j+1
ij
, b1−ij ), (104)
uij (b
j) ≤ uij (b
1). (105)
Keep in mind that in the congestion game, the utility only depends on the number of other players at the same slot.
For each j, based on the assumption that no two players move to the same slot, either the number of other players
l 6= ij at slot b
j+1
ij
in action profile bj+1 is the same or it drops compared to (bj+1ij , b
1
−ij
), which implies Inequality
104.
Furthermore, for each j, based on the assumption that no two players move from the same slot, the number of other
players l 6= ij at slot b
j
ij
in action profile bj is the same or it increases compared to c1, which implies Inequality 105.
This is also the reason why we cannot allow two players to move from the same slot: because it could happen, that the
change of circumstances due to the second one moving renders the move of the first one a worsening move.
Claim: L
t,pred
πr , L
t,Nash
πr
→ 0 for t→∞ without ever invoking line 14, i.e., without needing “undirected” search.
This is the analogous argument of convergence of classical best-response dynamics in congestion games against a NE
[Roughgarden, 2016]: also in our case the Φ is guaranteed to strictly increase (with some constant lower bound on
each decrease since the game is finite) until it reaches a “local” minimum, since we always let at least one customer
improve. Therefore we will never reach the same action profile again, i.e., never invoke lines 14 to 15.
And due to the assumed strictness of the NE, we will stay at a NE once it was announced. Then apply Corollary 1 of
the main paper.
Comment. Note that we assume A¯ to be given. This is to be more modular and better express the algorithm which is
on the proof-of-concept level. In principle A¯ can be inferred from data as well.
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